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INTRODUCTION
f
The commercial bank failures in Montana during the 1920=-1926 
period were a-tragic event in the state's history. Many areas were 
deprived of essential banking services and life-long savings disappeared 
as banks closed their doors. The human tragedy was extensive as finan­
cial losses left thousands penniless to fend for themselvesj thousands 
left the state. The entire episode reflected environmental conditions 
as well as basic weaknesses in the banking system.
The commercial bank failures of this period represented a com­
plex problem that involved social and political as well as economic 
aspects. Such a problem can.be viewed from several vantage points.
The events present numerous possibilities for study. Because of the 
impractical nature of adequately treating these many aspects within 
the present study5 the examination is restricted to several economic 
aspects of the problem® Specifically the study examines the major 
causes of the commercial bank failures in Montana during the early 
1920's.
The effect of environmental factors is examined as well as 
basic weaknesses in the banking system. What was the responsibility 
of governmental authorities in the tragedy? Were their actions res­
ponsible for the widespread failures? These relationships are exam­
ined with primary emphasis on the role of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis a Such emphasis is justified by the great importance 
of the Federal Reserve System to the banking operations of this per­
iod. . Another vital environmental factor was the agricultural distress
1
during this period. . Closely related to their local environments bank 
operations in Montana reflected .the agricultural distress of the 
early 1920*s. . These environmental factors— the actions of governmen­
tal authorities and agricultural distress--were important factors in 
the bank failures of this period.
Turning to an examination of the banking system* the study 
scrutinizes the financial strength of Montana banks. It asks the 
questions Was financial weakness a major factor in the Montana bank 
failures of the early 1920®s? The study reveals a basic weakness 
which was a major cause of the bank failures during this period. In 
addition* the closely related problems of bank size and financial di- 
versification are considered.
The bank failures of this period were largely the result of 
these factors. Certainly j,, no one reason can be assigned, as responsible 
for the tragic eventsj a combination of factors resulted in the wide­
spread wave of bank failures that left its mark upon the future.
CHAPTER I
THE SETTING OF MONTANA BANK FAILURES
During the short period of time, between 1920 and 19269 more 
than one-half of Montana1 s commercial banks failed*-^Of the 396 
state and national commercial banks in operation In 1920* 2lU had 
closed their doors within 6 years This tragic wave of bank fail­
ures was closely related to the economic conditions of the period®
The econoiiQr of Montana was primarily agricultural and was 
greatly affected in 1920 by the world-wide decline of agricultural 
prices,, It is as an extension of international* national and region­
al economic conditions that the dramatic events in Montana are placed 
in their proper perspective* Conditions in areas outside of Montana 
played a major role in the crisis of the early 1920*8 even though 
peculiar local circumstances made the situation more severe than in 
many other areas*
The economic displacements caused by the First World War 
were the source of many of the economic problems of the early 1920*s® 
National economies were highly specialized and trade patterns were a 
series of delicately balanced relationships* Generally the economic
^The term "failed" as used in this study includes % banks sus­
pending operationsj banks voluntarily liquidated! banks placed in the 
hands of receivers*
^Based on a tabulation of individual bank statements in the 
Annual Report of the Banking Department in Montana* Nov* 1$ 3 1920- 
June 30* 1926* and the AnnualReport of the Comptroller of the Cur­
rency 9 Sept* 8* 1920-Dec* 31s 1926* Only banks in operation on the 
beginning date are included* Failed banks are those banks that failed 
duping this period®
a
welfare of these nations depended heavily upon trade* Not only were 
these associations disrupted by the war, but the financial and fis­
cal stability of many nations was seriously damaged,, During the 
First World War gold flowed out of belligerent European nations to 
purchase necessary war materials and resulted in a reduction of their 
monetary gold supply„ This one-way flow was a disrupting factor in 
world trade relations* Neutral nations experienced the opposite ef­
fect as the large inflow of gold created excess reserves and exerted 
pressure on existing prices* In addition to these factors, terri­
torial realignments added further confusion to the economic prob­
lems of world trade
The shipment of gold bullion was not the only method used 
to finance the war purchases of belligerent nations» European coun­
tries liquidated large holdings of American investments! within a 
few years the United States became a creditor rather than a debtor 
nation,, In addition, the United States extended large amounts of 
credit to finance European purchases*
Farm prosperity in the United States during the war resul­
ted from the high prices received by farmers for their products and 
physical output did not increase materially until after the armis­
tice, Following the armistice, European nations tried rapidly to 
rebuild their shattered economies* Each nation sought national self- 
sufficiency as far as possible* In keeping with this policy, Euro­
pean agriculture quickly regained its former productive capacity*
^The Brookings Institution, The Recovery Problem in the Uni­
ted States, The Institute of Economics of the Brookings Institution 
publication no* 72 (Washington, D. C*, 1936), Cited hereafter
as Brookings Institution, Recovery Problem*
Ely 1925 s tiie agricultural production, of Europe reached its pre-war 
level.^ This recovery had a great impact on agricultural conditions 
in the United States since the war-time prosperity of farmers was 
largely the result of the increased European demand. As European 
agricultural production increased and as the credits extended by the 
United States decreased, a price decline began that affected agri­
cultural products around the world.
In the spring and summer of 1920, a world-wide price de­
cline took place. Hie avalanche of descending prices engulfed most 
industries and individuals. It began with the collapse of the silk 
market in Japan and spread in wide circles around the globe. The 
countries of the Far East-, India, Java, Australia, Europe and North 
and South America all were generally affected; in the same way and 
at the same time.*’ This economic collapse ended the brief period 
of rapid expansion in the United States that followed the war.
The economy of the United States expanded rapidly during 
the years of the First World War. Between 1915 and 1920 the level 
of national income more than doubled. Farm income in 1919 was 
more than double the average annual amount for the five year per­
iod preceding the war. . This increase in farm income was primarily 
the result of a 100 percent increase in the prices received by
^Brookings Institution, Recovery Problem, 13-Hu
5u„ S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, Hearing before the 
Joint Commission of Agriculturallnquiry, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 
(Washington, 192^), II, 13. Cited hereafter as U. S. Congress, 
Agricultural Inquiry9 II«
farmers for their products and only to a small extent by the 7 per­
cent increase in agricultural production®^
During the years immediately following the war5 agricultural 
and industrial production generally increased,, During the years of 
the early 1920 production was uneven® The world-wide price de­
clines in 1920 were reflected in the production indexes of most basic 
commoditieso Table 1 gives an index of production in several basic 
industries during this period® Table 2 illustrates the changes in 
agricultural production®
T A B L E  1
INDEXES OF PRODUCTION OF BASIC COMMODITIES3,
Item 1919 .1920 1921 1922 1923 192U 1925
General Index 100 105 80 98 120 108 116
Pig Iron 100 119 55 88 131 102 119Steel Ingots 100 121 57 102 129 109 131
Cotton Textiles 100 98 92 103 110 93 108
WooJ Textiles 100 89 98 98 110 95 9kHheat Flour 
Animals Slaught­
ered §
100 8h 92 95 96 101 95
Cattle 100 86 76 86 91 95 98
Calves 100 103 97 106 11a 126 137Sheep 100 86 103 87 92 95 96
Hogs 100 91 95 106 131 127 10aLumber 100 101 75 102 I2 h 118 12aCopper 100 105 39 82 122 131 139
aSource s National Industrial Conference Boards Inc ® s B
trial-Economic Conditions in the United States,,. Bulletin No® 17 
(New York, 1927)s 9®
Paul ¥® McCracken,, The Northwest in Two Warsa Federal Re­
serve Bank of Minneapolis (Minneapolis5 n0d„)<> 2-3® Cited here­
after as McCracken9 Northwest in Two Wars®
7
TABLE 2
PHYSICAL PRODUCTION INDEX FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1929-I00)a
Year Index
1919 86.1
1920 9 0 .1
1921 82.1
1922 91.0
1923 9U.0
1921* 96 cO
1925 96 .0
1926 101.0
aSources The Brookings Institution, The Recovery Problem 
in the United States 9 The Institute of Economics of the Brookings 
Institution publication no. 72 (Washington, D. C., 1936), 628.
Immediately following the end of the First World War, the 
accumulated demand for goods led to a period of intense spending 
and business prosperity in the United States. It was a period 
characterized by an "unprecedented orgy of extravagance, a mania 
for speculation, over-extended business in nearly all lines and in 
every section of the country, and general demoralization of the agen­
cies of production and distribution."^ A Congressional investigat­
ing commission in 1921 described these years as "a period of expan­
sion, extravagance, and speculation, the like of which has never
Obefore been seen in this country or perhaps in the world." In 
1920 a precipitous decline in prices took place. In the United- 
States the decline involved, every class of industry and people.^
7'Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual 
Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
December 319 19210 1. Cited hereafter as Annual Report of the Fed­
eral Reserve Board, 1921.
8U. S. Congress,. Agricultural Inquiry, II, 12-13.
S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, 13.
8
The tide of optimism and expansion quickly turned to one of defla­
tion and depression*. Agricultural prices declined sharply as Euro­
pean export demand declined.
The year 1922 in the United States was a period of continu­
ous economic recovery from the 1920 price decline. The latter half 
of 1921 was a period of relative price stability and this factor 
encouraged the expansion of business operations. In addition, 
agricultural conditions Improved although agricultural prices 
remained out of line with those of industry.^
In the spring of 1923 a slight recession took place in 
business activity and continued until the middle of the following 
year. In agricultural areas, farm income was as large as it was 
in 1923 and the result was an improvement in the relative position 
of the farmer. This readjustment between the levels of industrial 
and farm prices was an important factor in the restoration of busi­
ness prosperity later in the year."5"*- Throughout the 192^-1926 per­
iod, economic conditions continued to improve.. In 1926, industrial
output exceeded previous levels and wage payments and employment
12were high. Generally, agriculture enjoyed large crop yields.
Banking operations during the period following the turn 
of the century were closely related to economic conditions. Rising 
prices in the two decades following 1900 allowed profitable banking 
operations in spite of many slipshod p r a c t i c e s T h e  widespread
-^Annual Report of the Federal Reserve. Board, 1922,
^-Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 192b
Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 1926,
^Ibid. 0 13 0
9
prosperity and rising prices that occurred during the First World 
War were regarded as a normal situation.^
| During the war the banking system facilitated the mobili- ■ 
zation of the industrial and financial resources of the nation 
through its credit expansion. . Bank credit made possible the pur- 
. chase of large quantities of government bonds as well as the capi­
tal necessary for the productive expansion of industry. During 
this period the Federal Reserve System regulated its policy to 
meet the needs of the Treasury Department.- The success of the 
Victory Loan in May* 1919* depended upon a continuation of this 
easy credit policy. It was not tintil the rapid expansion was well 
under way that the Federal Reserve System adopted policies to 
tighten the availability of credit. The result of the easy credit 
policy was the extension by commercial banks of large amounts of 
credit based on the inflated commodity and land values of the per­
iod. Funds were loaned for land speculation and industrial expan-
1^sion and excess credit lines became common. In 1920 this expan­
sion was sharply curtailed. As prices and values declined banks 
were unable to liquidate loans to meet heavy deposit withdrawals 
and other financial strains. . The results were disastrous. j
These conditions were particularly true in Montana where 
rapid growth had pushed land values to new high levels. The popu­
lation of Montana had expanded rapidly after the turn of the century.
■^C. D. Bremer* American Bank Failures (New York* 1935) * 33. 
Cited hereafter as Bremer* Bank Failures. '
l5-'American Bankers Association^ Present Day Banking (New 
Yorks 1936)£ 218. Cited hereafter as Bankers Association* Present 
Day Banking.
/■
10
Between 1900 and 1920* the population more than doubled. This rapid 
increase of settlers was encouraged by the liberal provisions of 
the Homestead Acts of 1909 and 1912. Land grant size was increased 
from 160 to 320 acres and the proving-up time was decreased from 5 
to 3 years. Under these conditions a 320 acre plot of land could
■j /Lbe settled for less than 50 dollars.
With the rapid increase in population came an increase in
land values. Land that was valued at $250 million in 1910* by 1918 .
17was worth twice that amount. ' Wheat prices soared and optimistic 
farmers and bankers expected it to go even higher. Farmers borrow- 
ed to expand their operations at the inflated land values and bank­
ers prospered as values continued to increase.
Such dohditiohs: .could not continue indefinitely. In 1919* 
a period of drought overtook Montana. In 1920* severe winds swept 
away the'plowed top soil and added to the agricultural misery.
The drought continued into 1921 as falling farm prices aggravated 
an already severe situation. Farmers.tried to withhold their pro­
ducts from the market but were eventually forced to sell at rapid­
ly declining pricesMortgage foreclosures increased rapidly and 
between 1919 and 1925 the number reached 20*000 in the stated This 
tragic number represents the bulk of the farm foreclosures in the 
history of the state.
^Clarence W. Groth* "Montana Banking History*1 (unpublished 
thesis* School of Banking* Rutgers University)* 1*0. Cited hereafter 
as Groth* "Montana Banking History.*'
17k. Ro ss Toole* Montanas An Uncommon Land (Norman* 1959)* 
235o Cited hereafter as Toole* Uncommon Land.
l8Ibid.q 238.
II
/Montana banks generally were small institutions serving a 
small local area. Assets were largely confined to local loans and 
lacked the diversification necessary for financial strength. With 
the severe strain of the early 1920's, a majority of these banks 
(5U percent) were unable to continue operations. The widespread 
bank failures!*that took place added to Montana's grave economic 
distress.^
The Superintendent of Banks in Montana described the his­
tory of the period as a reading of "Jeremiah's Book of Lamenta­
tions" and an "Egyptian famine." The 1920-192U period was "one 
long dripping tunnel— a veritable nightmare" in which each new day 
brought new disasters. Of the 277 state banks reporting in 1921 
to his office, 85 held less than the required legal reserve and 
181 had not been examined by the Banking Department within the 
period required by law. The examinations that were conducted re­
vealed banks full of "second mortgages, frozen assets, land con­
tracts, commission notes and whatnot."^ It is with this under­
standing of the economic background of the period that attention 
is turned to another important aspect of the setting for Montana 
bank failures— the legal framework within which banks operated dur­
ing this period.
Since the founding of the American colonies, government 
has pursued an active and continually expanding role in the regu­
lation of economic life. Within the complex economic organization
Annual Report of.the Banking Department, State of Mont­
ana for the fiscal year ending June 309 192k* 12. Cited hereafter 
as Annual Report of the Banking Department, 1921;.
12
that evolved the banking system occupied a central position? banks 
became a fundamental factor in economic growth and prosperity*, Be­
cause of its quasi-public position* banking required governmental 
supervision which* by 1920* was a complex and sophisticated regula­
tory system* f .
«
Divided government control further complicated the system 
of bank regulation* The nation's banks were subject to regulation 
by forty-eight state governments as well as the Federal government. 
Within this complex system of regulation* jurisdictional problems 
often developed. Banks were frequently subject to the regulation 
of several governmental agencies. Often* as in Montana* there was
a striking similarity between Federal and state requirements. How­
ever* Federal supervision generally entailed more restrictive re­
quirements than the state banking codes.
The Federal government took several early steps toward 
strengthening. the banking system. . In I86I4 a step was taken toward 
uniform direction and control of bahking by the Federal government 
when the Banking Act was passed. This act provided the legal 
framework of a national banking system. Primary responsibility 
for the supervision of the national banks to be chartered under 
this act was given to the Bureau of the Comptroller of the Cur­
rency. Restrictions were imposed on the organization* note issue 
and required reserves of national banks. Several changes were made 
in these laws in the following years. A major revision of the laws 
regulating national banks took place in 1913 with the passage of 
the Federal Reserve Act.
:i"3
. By 1920, Federal regulation of national banks had developed 
into a complex legal framework. Organization and liquidation was 
under the direction of the Comptroller of the Currency. Capital 
requirements were set at $200,000 for banks located in cities with 
more than 50,000 inhabitantsj $100,000 for cities between 6,000 and 
50,000j $50,000 for cities from 3,000 to 6,000j $25*000 for cities 
of less than 3,000 inhabitants. Reserve requirements for demand 
deposits were set at 13 percent for central reserve city banks,
10 percent for reserve city banks, and 7 percent for other national 
banks. , Time deposits required a reserve of 3  percent. These re­
serves were to be deposited with the Federal Reserve bank and cash 
on hand could not be included as a part of the required reserve. 
Stockholders were:-liable for the debts of the bank to the extent 
of the par value of their shares in addition to the amount inves-
Ited in them, f  In addition, numerous limitations were placed on 
other aspects of the banks operations. Loans to any individual, 
partnership or corporation were limited in amount to 10 percent of 
the paid-in capital and surplus. Loans could not be made using 
the bank's shares as collateral. The Comptroller of the Currency 
conducted at least two examinations annually of each bank. A 
minimum of five financial reports were required each year. In 
addition, special reports could be requested whenever it was deemed 
necessary.
The scope of national bank operations was expanded corisid- 
erably by the Federal Reserve Act. Former restrictions had placed 
national banks at a competitive disadvantage with state banks.
lU
Many of these restrictions were removed by the Federal Reserve Act. 
National banks were granted fiduciary powers in areas where state 
banks enjoyed this privilege. The reduction of reserve requirements 
and the privilege of extending real estate loans opened the profit­
able savings business to national banks. Loans were permitted on 
unencumbered, improved farm land. These loans could' not exceed 
50 percent of.the market value of the property and were limited to 
a maximum period of five years. The total amount of such loans 
could not exceed 25 percent of the lending bank's capital and sur- 
plus or one-third of its time deposits. Loans on improved urban 
property were permitted for a maximum maturity of one year. These
restrictions were only a few of the many regulations applied to
panational bank, operations. ^
Another important governmental agency was created by the 
Federal Reserve Act.| The Federal Reserve System was established to 
provide the nation with an elastic currency, discounting facilities
f
and improved banking supervision. Membership was required for all 
national banks while participation was optional for state banks. 
Important changes were made to the original bill in the following 
years. After the crisis of 1920, farm groups were successful in
' • ‘ I 1 ‘ . ,
obtaining several changes in :the law. An amendment in 1922 pro­
vided for a representative of agriculture on the Federal Reserve 
Board. Concessions were made in 1923 when the capital requirements 
for membership of state banks were lowered by 60 percent. In
Statutes at Large, XXXVIII-XLI, Title 12 passim.
15
addition, Federal Reserve banks were allowed to discount or purchase
certain agricultural sight drafts3 acceptances, and agricultural 
21papero
Membership in the Federal Reserve ^stem. involved certain 
obligations. .Generally these requirements were similar to those 
prescribed for national banks. In addition to meeting these re­
quirements, member banks enjoyed the use of the loan and rediscount- 
ing as well we the check collecting facilities of the Federal Re­
serve System.
By 1920, the number of state banks considerably exceeded 
the number of national banks. These banks were subject fcto the 
supervision of state officials. In Montana the first banking laws 
were enacted in 1887, prior to statehood. During the following 
years these banking laws were improved and expanded. In 19155 
extensive revisions were made to the banking code. It was gener­
ally within this legal framework of 1915 that the state banks of 
Montana operated during.the 1920-1926 period.
The Banking Department was established to exercise govern­
mental supervision over state banks and was placed under the direc­
tion of the Superintendent of Banks. The State Examiner became 
ex-officio Superintendent of Banks and was appointed to a four 
year term by the governor. The Superintendent was primarily con­
cerned with the financial condition of state banks and to insure 
observation of state banking laws. In order to determine the
^^Fredrick A. Bradfords Banking (Mew York9 1932)s 75-121* 
passim. Cited hereafter as Bradford, Banking.
16
financial condition of state banksthe Superintendent required five 
regular financial reports each year. In addition to these5 special 
reports could be requested when deemed necessary. 'At least two 
bank examinations were required each year to provide a verification 
of the bank’s financial condition. In these audits, examiners con­
cerned themselves with the bank’s observation of sound banking 
principles as well as their compliance with legal requirements.
1 By 1920, state banks were subject tb a considerable number
1
of state requirements. Operations could begin and end only with 
the approval of the Banking Department. A minimum of $20s000 was 
set for bank capital. Stockholders were liable for bank debts to 
the extent of the par value of their shares in addition to the 
amount invested in them. | Real estate loans were generally restric­
ted'to first liens and a maximum loan amount was set at 50 percent 
of the property’s market value. A maximum of 35 percent of the 
bank’s assets'could be in this form. Loand to any individuals 
partnership or corporation could not exceed 20 percent of the capi­
tal and surplus of the bank. Reserve requirements were set at 
10 percent of deposits, a portion of which could be deposited with 
reserve banks approved by the Superintendent. Reserve banks were 
required to maintain a 15 percent reserve in a similar manner. These 
requirements , in many respects, were similar to those for national 
banks. ̂
Other governmental authorities., to a lesser extent, influ­
enced the operation of the bahking system. By 1920 these governmental
^^Montana5 Revised Statutes (1921)s c. 13, secs. 601ii=6l09®
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relationships had become an important characteristic of the banking 
system* It is in this light that these relationships become an im­
portant part of the bank failure pattern of the early 1920's.
Economic conditions and governmental regulations were im­
portant factors in the setting of Montana bank failures. It.-is 
with this understanding that the following chapter turns to a de­
tailed examination of the bank failure pattern*
CHAPTER II 
THE PATTERN OF BANK FAILURES
The widespread wave of bank failures during the early 1920's 
revealed several basic weaknesses in the banking system. The eco­
nomic- readjustment that followed the end of World War I brought a 
sharp decline in the prices of agricultural products. Farmers faced 
a rapidly decreasing income while the price of needed supplies con- 
tinned to increase. | Faced with high fixed mortgage payments and 
rising costs, the farmers turned to local banks for credit. Small, 
unit banks in rural agricultural areas were soon overburdened with 
past due and uncollectable loans. A widespread wave of bank fail­
ures reflected this financial distress. A large percentage of the 
nation's banks failedj others continued operations throughout the 
1920-1926 period. In several important respects, common charac­
teristics can be•distinguished between these failing and non-failing 
banks. Such a failure pattern becomes an important consideration 
in understanding the bank failures of this period."*' |
An important aspect of bank operations was the supervising 
authority of governmental agencies. A noted difference existed 
between the failure of nationally and state chartered banks. For 
the United States"as a whole, state banks failed twice as often as 
national banks. The average yearly suspension of total active
^The classification of failing banks, except in Tables 1- 
U, includes state banks that suspended operations between Nov. 1$9 
1920, and June 30, 1926. National banks are included as failing 
that closed between Sept. 8, 1920 and Dec. 31, 1926, and did not 
reopen.
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commercial banks for the 1921=1925 period was 1.06 percent for 
national banks and 2.17 percent for state banks. Although these 
differences varied from year to year5 the percentage of state bank 
failures was higher than those for national banks throughout the 
period. Table 3 illustrates this yearly difference.
TABLE 3
PERCENT OF SUSPENDING BANKS TO TOTAL ACTIVE 
COMMERCIAL BANKS BY TYPE OF BANK 
IN THE UNITED STATES a
Ratio State
Year National State to Nat?l
1921 ,6h% 1.83$ 2.86
1922 .59 1.3U 2.27
1923 lo09 2.U? 2 .26
192h 1.50 2.95 1.97
1925 1.1*6 2.26 1.55
aCalculated from2 All-Bank Statistics! United States 
1896=19553 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Wash= 
ington^ D. C.s 1959)«>.!il? U5S and Banking and Monetary Statistics9 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Washington^ D. G.3 
19U3)9 283.
In. Montana there were important differences from these na= 
tional averages. A higher percentage of both national and state 
banks failed in Montana than the average for the United States.
The average yearly suspension of active Montana commercial banks 
was 10.1 percent for national banks and 12.2 percent for state 
banks. The average yearly suspensions for this 5 year period in 
Montana exceeded the United States average by 9.5 times for national 
banks and 5.6 times for state banks. However5 the ratio between 
state and national bank failures in Montana was much less than for 
the nation as a whole. These yearly differences are shown in the 
following table.
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TABLE k
PERCENT OF SUSPENDING BANKS TO TOTAL ACTIVE 
COMMERCIAL BANKS BY TYPE OF BANK 
IN MONTANA a
Ratio State
Year National State to Nat8l
1921 tio 9% 5o h% 1.10
1922 6 .8 8 .2 1 .21
1923 llwO 2l*.8 1.77
192U H 4..0 18 .1 1.29
1925 10.6 k.7 .UU
aGalculated froms All-Bank Statistics1 United States
1896-195^9 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemTWash- 
ingtoixj, Di Co9 19$9)s 609 ̂ 613 ̂ and Banking and Monetary Statistics9 
Board of Governors ©f the Federal Reserve System (Washingtons Do C. 5 
19U3)s.90, 188s 286.
The comparison of national and state bank failures is even 
more striking when bank deposits are examined. Deposits of sus­
pending state banks averaged 2.8? times higher than for suspending 
national banks for the 5 year period. The yearly percentages in the 
following table show this variation.
TABLE 5
PERCENT OF DEPOSITS IN SUSPENDING BANKS TO TOTAL 
ACTIVE COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS BY TYPE OF 
BANK IN THE UNITED STATES a
Year National State
Ratio State
. tb'.'-Natilt.
1921- olh% .78$ 5.57
1922 .12 .36 3.00
1923 .20 .53 2.65192L .35 .60 1.71
1925 .28 .111 1 .U6
aCalculated froms All-Bank Statisticsj United States 1896- 
1955.9 Board , of Governors ©f the Federal Reserve System (Washington* 
D. C.a 1959), UU* and Banking and Monetary Statistics, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Washington, D. C.s 19U3) <> 
20=21, 283.
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In Montana the percentage of suspended deposits to total 
deposits was much higher than the nation-wide average. National 
and state banks in the United States averaged deposit suspensions 
of .22 percent and .58 percent of their deposits respectively for 
the 1921-1921? period. In Montana national bank deposit suspensions 
averaged lj,08 percent while those for state banks averaged 8.3 percent 
during this period. The ratio of state bank deposit suspensions to
t
national bank suspensions was much less than the nation-wide average. 
In Montana state bank deposit suspensions averaged 1.77 times those 
of national banks during the 1921-1925 period. This stands in 
sharp contrast to the nation-wide average for state bank deposit 
suspensions of 2.88 times those of. national banks. Table 6 illus­
trates the yearly percentages for Montana.
TABLE 6
PERCENT OF DEPOSITS IN SUSPENDING BANKS TO TOTAL 
ACTIVE COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS BY TYPE 
OF BANK IN MONTANA a
Ratio State
Year National State to Nat'l
1921 .1.9$ 6„k% 3.37
1922 it.l 5.6 1.37
1923 8.9 18.6 2.09
192k 6.8 9.3 1.37
1925 2.1 lok .66
Calculated froms All-Bank Statistics g United States 1896°
1955.0 Board of Governors of”the Federal Reserve System (Washington*
Di C.a 1959)a 6082 612a and Banking and Monetary Statistics9 Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Washington s D. C.a 1953)<>
28y3 2893 291.
The Federal Reserve System prescribed certain requirements 
for national and state memberr banks. One of the objectives of the
22
System was to bring financial stability to the banking system as a 
whole. In the United States during the early 1920's <, non-member
banks generally failed twice as often as Federal Reserve member
2 ' - ' banks. This difference was less distinct in Montana. An examina­
tion of Montana banks in 1920 shows that 5>X percent of member and 
Si percent .of non-member banks file’d by the end of the period. These 
differences are illustrated by the following table.
TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL RESERVE MEMBER 
BANKS AND NON-MEMBER- BANKS IN MONTANA a
Member Non-Member
Banks Number Percent Number Percent
Failing 100 $±% 111*.
Nan-Failing 96 h9 86 2+3
Total 196 100 200 100
a-.Calculated froms statements contained in the.Annual Reports 
of the Montana Banking Department between Nov. ±Ss 19205 and June 3Qa 
1926a and from. statements in . the Annual Reports of the Comptroller 
of the Currency between Sept.. 8,, 1920,, and Dec. 31 <, 1926. Membership 
is based on membership of state banks on Nov. ±Ss ±920s and of nation­
al banks on Sept. 85 1920.
Bank size was another important part of the failure patterne 
Failing banks generally were smaller institutions than non-failing 
banks. |The average capitalizations of failing national and state 
banks in Montana were $Ii73770 and $359928 respectively. These av­
erages for non=failing banks were $685676 and §\xlsb$& respectively.
2See statistics in Banking and Monetary Statistics9 Board 
of Governors of the Federal"Reserve System (Washingtons D. C. 5 
19k3)s>. 21-225 283.
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Numerous exceptions existed to this general rule. Individual large 
banks as well as small banks failed. However^ larger banks were 
able to withstand the financial pressures of the early 1920>s better 
than the smaller^ less diversified banks. The following table clas- 
sifies Montana commercial banks by the amount of capitalization.
t a b u ; 8
Capital
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAILING AND NON-FAILING BANKS 
IN MONTANA CLASSIFIED BY CAPITALIZATION a
Failing Non-Failing
Number Percent Number Percent
63 29*$% 35 19 o 2%
95 Uk.k 72 39*6
31 Uio5 33 18.1
15 7®0 2U 13<>28 3o7 12 6.6
2 .9 6 3»3
-2U 100.0 182 100.0-
-$20s000 
:.205001“  305000 
30s001-  50s000 
5osooi-loo5ooo 
100 ,,001-200,,000 
2005001-500s000
Total
aCalculated froms statements contained in the Annual Reports 
of the Montana Banking Department between Nov.. l5<> 1920,, and June 30s 
1926 s and from statements in the Annual Reports o:f the Comptroller 
of the Currency between Sept. 85 1920s and Dec. 315 1926. Capitali- 
zation amount for national banks, is as of Sept® 85 19205 and for 
state banks as of Nov. l$s 1920.
Capitalization is only one method of indicating.the size.of 
a bank. When considered as an isolated factor in determining bank 
size it may be misleading. In addition to capitalization,, other 
factors should be considered. Another means of comparing the rela­
tive size of banks is by comparing total resources. The averages 
of total resources for failing national and state banks in Montana 
were $319sl|ll and $5625527 respectively. These averages for non­
failing national and state banks were $1|95<>813 and $982s78?
2U
respectively* These averages and the classification of banks by total 
resources in Table 9 .show that banks with &mall.<-resources failed more 
often than banks with larger total resources*
TABLE 9
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAILING AND NON “FAILING BANKS 
IN MONTANA CLASSIFIED BY TOTAL RESOURCES a
Total Resources
- $100*000 
100*001=- 2^0*000 
250*001= 500*000 
500*001- 1*000*000 
1*000*001= 2*500*000 
2*500*001= 5*000*000 
5*000*001=
Total 
aCalculated froms
of the Montana Banking Department between Nov*. l5fl 1920* and June 3Q* 
1926* and from statements in the'Annual Reports of the ' Comptroller' of 
the Currency between Sept* 8* 1920* and Dec-. 3-ip 1926. Total resources 
for national banks are as of Sept; 8* 1920* and for state banks as of 
Nov. 15* 1920.
■Another useful measure of bank size is the amount of total time 
and demand deposits. .The average total deposits in failing Montana 
national and1 state banks were $355s9k9 and $20^*965 respectively. These 
averages for non-failing national and state banks for the 5 year per­
iod were $691*555 and $369*138 respectively® Failing banks generally 
were smaller than non-failing banks whether measured by capitalization* 
total resources* or deposits. A comparison of failing and non-failing 
bank deposits in Montana is contained in the following table.
Failing Non-Failing
timber Percent Number Percent
23 10.7$ 12 6.6%
96 kk.9 73 hOol
59 27.6 Uo 22.0
17 7.9 31 17.0
13 6.1 13 7.16 2.8 11 6.1
0  0 0 0 0 2 1.1
21k 100.0 182 100.0
statements contained in the
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TABLE 10
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAILING AND NON “FAILING 
BANKS IN MONTANA CLASSIFIED BY DEPOSITSa
Failing Non-Failing
[umber Percent Number Percent
50 23.1$ 18 9o9%
58 27.1 56 30.8
72 33.6 55 30.2
13' 6.1 23 12.612 5.6 8 u.u8 3.7 15 8.21 .5 5 2.8
0 © 0 0 0 2 1.1
211* 100.0 182 100.0
Deposits*3
- $753000 
75*ooi- i5o,ooo
150.001- 350^000 
350,001“ 600,000
600.001-1,000,000 
1,000,001-2,500,000 
2,500,001-5*000,000
5,000,001-
Total
el.Calculated froms statements contained in the Annual Re­
ports of the Montana Banking Department between Not, 15, 1920, and 
June '30, 1926, and^from statements in the Annual Reports of the 
Comptroller of the Currency between Sept. 8V1920, and Dec. 31«
19260
Includes time and demand deposits on Nov. 15, 1920, for 
state banks and on Sept, 8, 1920, for national banks.
Since a bank primarily serves its local area, the location of
failing and non-failing banks is an important part of the failure-pat­
tern, Failures west of the Continental Divide in Montana were a
smaller percentage of the area's active commercial banks than, in the 
remainder of the state,, This East-West distribution of failures is 
illustrated by Table 11,
Generally,, failing banks were located in smaller communities 
than non-failing banks. This factor and the East-West distribution of 
bank failures suggests the rural, agricultural influence upon the 
failure pattern. Nearly 58 percent of the bank failures in Montana 
occurred in communities of less than 500 population. For the United
26
States as a whole, 3lu9 percent of failures were in communities with 
less than 500 population. Failures in Montana communities of less than
2.,000 persons included 85 percent of the state’s bank failures. Table 
12 illustrates the failure? pattsbnrhyp the-: :©ize of the community.
TABLE 11
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAILING AND NON-FAILING BANKS 
IN MONTANA CLASSIFIED BY LOCATION3, bEast West
Banks Numberv Percent Number ■ Percent
Failing 19k 56. h% 20 38.5#Non-Failing 150 U3.o 32 61.5
Total 31*1* 100.0 52 100.0
aCalculated from the location of failing banks indicated in state­
ments in the Annual Reports of the Montana Banking Department between 
Nov. 15, 19207 and~June 20/ 19269 and from. statements in the Annual Reports 
of the Comptroller of the Currency between Sept. 8, 1920, and Dec. 31, 1926.
/^Includes areas west of the Continental Divide in Montana.
TABLE 12
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAILING AND NON-FAILING BANKS 
IN MONTANA CLASSIFIED BY SIZE OF COMMUNITY3,
•U Failing Non-FailingCommunity Population Number Percent Number Percent
300 90 1*2.0 50 27.5
301- 500 3h 15.9 25 13.7
501- 1,000 31 H i.5 35 19.2
1,001-; 000 27 12.6 27 H i .8
2,001- 3,000 11 5 .1 8 li.U
3s001= 5,000 • • 0 9 0 9 5 .0
5 , 001=10,000 12 5 .6 9 5 .0
10,001=20,000 i* 1.9 12 6 .6
20,001- 5 2.1* 7 3.8
Total 21I* 100.0 182 100.0
aCalculated from the location of failing banks indicated by state­
ments in the Annual Report of the Banking Department in Montana between
Nov. 15, 1920, and June 30, 1926, and from Statements in the Annual Report
of the Comptroller of the Currency between Sept. 8, 1920, and Dec. 31, 1926.
"LBased on population in 1920.
3Bremer, Bank Failures, 1*8.
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A useful comparison of failing and non-failing banks is one that 
examines the length of bank life prior to failureo This comparison 
shows the extent that banks had become an accepted and long-standing 
part of the community. In Table 13 banks are arranged into categories 
by the date of their incorporation. Of the failing banks3 79 percent 
were incorporated after 1910j 68 percent of the non-failing banks were 
incorporated during the same period. From this eorrparison it is evident 
that failing banks were not as well established and were newer ins tit u- 
tions than non-failing banks. '
TABLE 13
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAILING AND NON-FAILING 
BANKS IN MONTANA CLASSIFIED BY LENGTH 
OF LIFE PRIOR TO 1920a
Failing Non-Failing
Incorporation Date Number Percent ■ Number Percent
1918 -1920 31 1 5  lh 8
1915 - 1917 6? 30 55 30
1910 - 1 9 1 1 *  73 3k $k 30
1905 - 1909 30 Ik 28 1 5
1900 - 190U 7 U 13 7
- 1899 6 3 18 9
Total 21k 100 182 100
aSource % Calculated from; Statements contained in the Annual 
Report of the Banking Department between Nov. X55 1920«, and June 30 .> 
19262 and from statements in the Annual Report of the Comptroller of 
the Currency between Sept. 85,1920s and Dee. 31, 19267
The bank failures in Montana during the 1920-1926 period were 
primarily a rurals small bank phenomena. Closely tied to the local 
economy <> small rural banks often were unable to withstand the crisis 
created by sharply declining agricultural prices. The widespread wave 
of bank failures demonstrated the basic weaknesses of the nation's 
small unit banking system. . Among these weaknesses several major
\
28
problems are apparent,, These aspects of the banking system— regula­
tory authority, agricultural factors,, financial strength, and bank 
size— merit further examination in the following chapters.
CHAPTER III 
THE HOLE OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES
The legal framework of banking laws and regulations was an 
important part of the bank failure pattern of the early 1920"s.
State banks generally failed more often than national banks in the 
United States. This variation can be partially explained by the 
higher standards required for national bank charters. The result 
of this stricter policy was that national banks generally were 
stronger and more diversified institutions than most state banks.
In Montana the difference between state and national bank regula­
tions was less than in many states. As a result,, the difference was 
not as great between the individual banks and their failure rates. 
Comparisons between Federal Reserve member and non-member state 
banks reflect this same relationship.
|j Generallys the influence of governmental policy upon the 
operations of individual banks was indirect and should not be over­
emphasized. Government regulation and supervision could not insure,, 
in itself* a sound banking policy. It could only assist in attain­
ing that end."*" General responsibility for the operation of a bank 
rests with its management. Since the test of effective management
"*"R. F. Leonard,, "Supervision of the Commercial Banking System.,," 
Banking Studies„ Board nf Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
B̂altimore,, ±9l\l)3 192.
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2is the ability to resolve unforeseen difficulties, the responsibility 
for a bank's failure rests with its management and generally cannot be 
shifted to others.,, \
What, then3 was the relationship of government actions during 
the 1920-1926 period, to the widespread wave of bank failures? In 
answering this question, primary concern is directed toward those 
agencies that directly supervised the operations of commercial banks—  
the state Banking Department in. Montana, the Comptroller of the Cur­
rency, and the Federal Reserve System.
The banking system, as a whole, has suffered from the division 
of governmental supervision. The existence of different systems of 
governmental supervision has encouraged competition between govern­
mental agencies to extend their influence and jurisdiction. This 
competition was responsible for many of the problems that faced banks 
during the early 1920’s. The unit banking system that developed in 
the United States was a natural outgrowth of this divided jurisdiction.
States-rights became an effective barrier against a more uniform sys- 
3tern. The result was a competitive lowering of banking restrictions 
and a situation that made reform difficult .A The ability of indivi­
dual banks to shift from one system to the other made authorities re­
luctant to strengthen banking requirements or to strictly enforce their 
provisions.
pBremer, Bank Failures, 99«
3Ibid.9 9$„
^Thomas Joel Anderson, Federal and State Control of Banking 
(New York, 193k)9 3, 30k• Cited hereafter as Anderson,. Control of
Banking.
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Governmental competition was reflected in the chartering of 
banks« Charters often were granted to banks that would compete with 
those operating under another governmental authority where the need 
for such additional services did not exist. The inevitable result was 
an excessive number of banks. By 1921 the number of banks in the Uni- 
ted States reached an all-time high of nearly 23<,000 state and 8^000
5- national banks. Bitter competition developed between banks for the 
available business. This excessive chartering of banks was a funda­
mental cause of the bank failures in the early 1920 s s.^ States where
the number of banks to population was hig.ha without exceptions suf-
7fered high bank failure rates. This relationship is illustrated by
the experience of New Jersey where a strict charter policy prevailed
■ 8and where bank failure were negligible.
The bank failure pattern in the Ninth Federal Reserve Dis­
trict reflected this overbanked condition. Credit competition often 
resulted in questionable loans made by banks— "loans which often
Obroke the banks and debtors alike." Tables 11+ and 1£ illustrate 
that Montana was no exception to this general pattern. Between 
1910 and 1920 there were 397 bank charters granted in Montana. In
^Bankers Association Present Day Banking., 196-97*
6Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency for the Year 
Ending December 31~i 1925 „ 5° Cited hereafter as Annual Report of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, 1925°
7Bahkers Association,, Present Day Banking, 2l£.
OVirgil Willits Chain, Group and Branch Banking (New Yorks 
1930. 126. Cited hereafter as Willit. Banking.
^McCracken* Northwest in Two Wars, 17«
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1917 a high, point was reached when 82 charters were a p p r o v e d B e ­
tween 1911 and 1920 the total number of banks increased from 175 to
11U31 in Montanao By 1930 this total had declined to its 1911 level. 
The fact that many of the charters issued were never used indicates 
a careless charter policy. Obtaining a charter often became a specu­
lative undertaking in anticipation of a profitable opportunity. If
/
the opportunity failed to materialize, the charter simply was not 
12used. Chartering officials generally shared the optimism of the 
period and felt that rapid growth would quickly justify their liberal 
charter policy.^
TABLE lit
NUMBER OF PEOPLE PER BANK FOR 1909 AND 1921 BX STATE3,
Population per Bank
State 1909 1921
Michigan ks670 5,130
Wisconsin 3,920 2,710
Minnesota 2,390 1,590
MONTANA 2,920 1,370
South Dakota 9h6 92.1
North Dakota 8 99 768
United States*5 3,95 0 3,520
aSources Curtis L. Mosher, The Causes of Banking Failure in 
the Northwestern States (Minneapolis, 1930), 28.
, ^ Excludes island possessions.
" '  )■
®̂G.roth, "Montana Banking History," Li3°
11Curtis Le Mosher, The Causes of Banking Failure in the North­
western States (Minneapolis^ 1930), 8. Cited hereafter as Mosher, 
Causes of Failure.
“I OGroth, "Montana Banking History," Lii~U5<
-^Mosher, Causes of Failure, 6-7.
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| By failing to insist on proper banking standards* the Banking 
Department in Montana and the Comptroller of the Currency indirectly 
contributed to a weak banking system.^ Frequent attempts were made 
to liberalize national bank requirements. In 1900 the minimum capi­
tal requirement for national banks was reduced, from. $50*000 to a 
$25*000 minimum. The restriction on the amount of national bank-notes 
that could be issued was changed from. 90 percent to 100 percent of 
the value of bonds deposited to secure their issue. In 1906 the 
restrictions on total loans to any one individual*, firm or corpora­
tion by an individual bank were changed from 10 percent of capital to
1510 percent of capital and surplus.. These were only a few of the 
changes made to liberalize banking requirements. Since state require­
ments generally were more liberal than national bank requirements* the 
Comptroller of the Currency argued that national banks operated under 
a competitive disadvantage. His annual reports for the early 1920"s 
asked that the two types of banks be placed on an equal, footing.
TABLE 15
NUMBER OF BANKS TO POPULATION FOR SELECTED STATES IN 1920a
State No. of Banks ■ Population Average No. People per Bank
Minnesota 1*515 2*387*000 1*600
MONTANA U31 5!i.9*OQO 1*300North Dakota 898 614?.* 000 700
South Dakota 69!* 637*000 900New York 1*056 10*385*000 9*800
Pennsylvania 1*51*6 8*720*000 5*700
Massachusetts U65 3*852*000 8*300
'aSource!; Paul W. McCracken* The Northwest in Two Wars* Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis '(Minneapolis;* n.d.)* l6o
111Bremer* Bank Failures* 110. 
■^Anderson* Control of Banking* 316.
| State banking officials and the Comptroller of the Currency con­
tributed to the collapse of the early 19209 s by continually lowering 
banking standards and by the granting of an excessive number of bank 
charters „ The excessive number of banks in Montana during this period 
was an important factor in the inability of the banking system to 
withstand the crisis during the 1920=1926 period,,
Government supervision of banking was extended in 1913 by the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve System,, Its objectives included 
the establishment of a flexible note supply based on self-liquidating
commercial paper and the establishment of a source of emergency credit
17for banks in times of financial stress „ The System was not esta­
blished to prevent bank failures although its functions contributed to 
a strengthening of the banking system,. The System could not assure 
good bank management or make a bank's operations automatically success­
ful,,18
At the time of its establishment3 central banking experience
was nonexistent and the role of the Federal Reserve System was not
clearly defined. Early Federal Reserve officials were commercial
bankers and lacked a clear understanding of the functions of a central 
19banko In addition,, the accepted theory of business cycles affected 
Federal Reserve actions„ Federal Reserve officials viewed periods of
17Bradford,, Banking9 UI460
1 Q Charles Wallace Collins, Rural Banking Reform (New York,
1931)5 Ul-1*2.
1 '* L 19̂Letter of Glement Van Nice to John Ho Tooles Dec. 85 1966.' 
(Copy in the possession of Dr. K. Ross Toole,, Department of History5 
University of Montana.) Cited hereafter as Letter of Clement Van Nice 
to John H. Toole5 Dec. 8S 1966.
boom and rapid expansion as the inevitable result of excessive credit 
expansion. Depression was the inevitable result of such an inflation­
ary boom. If credit was restricted to its proper role of financing 
the production and distribution of goods3 inflation and depression would 
be prevented. The use of credit for such speculative ventures as with­
holding products from the market in anticipation of a price increase
was regarded as improper. Indeed,, Federal Reserve officials viewed the
20post-war period of expansion as a period of credit misuse.
Because of this theory,, the Federal Reserve System viewed its 
role as one of assisting in the "orderly liquidation" that would follow 
the inflationary period. Liquidation was regarded as necessary for 
economic recovery. The proper role of the Federal Reserve System was 
a passive one that would facilitate the liquidation process. Actions 
to stimulate recovery were regarded as artificial and even as super- t 
flclaloI High rediscount rates were necessary to assist the liquida­
tion of credit excesses accumulated during the preceding boom period 
and to discourage nonessential credit expansion. It was believed 
that only in this way could a sound recovery be realized. The in­
fluence of these ideas on the actions of the Federal Reserve System 
during the early 1920's is apparent when the events of this period 
are examined. j
| During the First World War the government encouraged rapid 
productive expansions Federal Reserve policy during this period 
generally followed the needs of the government. Bank credit expan­
ded rapidly to encourage rapid industrial expansion and to finance
onClay J. Anderson5 A Half-Century of Federal Reserve Policy­
makings 193it°1961»a Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Philadel­
phia^ £1965/) c, 16-3I4. passim. Cited hereafter as Anders on s Federal 
Reserve Policymaking.
By the spring of 1919 the Treasury Department had floated
21
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large government expenditures„ Rediscount rates were set at artifi 
cially low levels and preferential rates were allowed on government 
securitieso
loans totaling $21 billion at interest rates below the market levels 
Such an undertaking would have been impossible without the cooperation 
of the Federal Reserve System,, The extension of Federal Reserve credit 
in the form of loanss rediscounts and bills purchased increased be­
tween 1917 and 1918 by 1SU87 percent,, During the same period Federal
22Reserve notes increased lj.83 percent„
Between 1918 and 1919 <> the Federal Reserve Board continued 
to follow the policy of the Treasury Department„ The System tried 
to curb excessive credit expansion through appeals to member banks 
for the elimination of speculative and nonessential loans, The de­
mand for additional collateral for rediscounts was an attempt to
reduce member bank rediscounts by reducing their supply of eligible 
23paper. Such policies generally were unsuccessful in restricting 
the rapid credit e x p a n s i o n I n  May 1919 the Victory Loan was 
floated at U 3 percent. It was not until this operation was com­
plete that the Treasury Department felt secure enough to agree to 
any credit restriction by the Federal Reserve System, By this time 
the rapid economic expansion and inflation were well advanced.
Concern began to develop over rapidly increasing prices as 
inflationary pressures continued. Complaints were heard on all sides
^Bradf©rd5 Banking j, 14*8.
22U. S. Congress9 Agricultural Inquiry«, II9 37.
23"Anderson. Federal Reserve Policymakings 21-22,
?) 1
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about the high cost of living, Ôn May 17, 1920, the United States 
Senate adopted a resolution asking the Federal Reserve Board to re­
port what actions had been taken to meet the inflationary threat. 
Newspapers joined the clamor for price reductions. This growing con­
cern and the increasing;-, exhaustion of credit resources produced a rapid 
change in the psychological attitude of the people. With the beginning 
of the price decline in 1920., optimism turned to timidity. Merchants
25cancelled orders and bankers began to contract their loans. The 
entire process had a snowballing effect. I
Free from the necessity to pattern actions by Treasury De­
partment policy, the Federal Reserve System, began to slowly tighten 
the supply of credit. In December 1919 rediscount rates were raised 
slightly and larger advances were made throughout the following year. 
Several Federal Reserve banks had reached 7 percent by midyear. Uni­
form rates were adopted and the differential on government securities 
was abolished. Rates were based on loan maturity regardless of the 
security pledged on the theory that member bank endorsement made all 
rediscounts theoretically sound. The elimination of preferential
rates on government securities led to widespread selling of these
26securities as banks turned to investments with higher yields. The 
large influx of government bonds onto the market caused the price to 
fall sharply. J
| The problem of Federal Reserve credit policy was complicated 
by the credit position of many banks. In 1920 roughly one-5*third of
2^U. So Congress, .Agricultural Inquiry, II, §5.
2 6 ^  ,Q
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the nation’s banks were overextended., one-third were moderately ex­
tended and one-third were lending conservatively,, The one-third 
that was overextended generally had reached the point where further 
borrowing would endanger their solvency. An easing of credit policy 
by the Federal Reserve System would encourage an expansion of loans. 
If loans were expanded during a period of rapidly declining prices 
the credit strain would become more pronounced and the possibility 
of bank failures would increase. A rediscount rate reduction of
sufficient magnitude to arrest the process of liquidation seemed
2? 'to be a real menace. Because of this situation«, the Federal Re­
serve System was reluctant to encourage an easy credit policy. The 
choice seemed to fee one of high rediscount rates with the resulting 
hardships or lower rates and the possibility of a financial.crisis.
The first alternative was selected, j 
\
ffiy September X9205 the general commodity price index fell
from a peak of 2?2 to 2ij.2 and the agricultural products price index
fell from 2.kh to 210 „ Strong sentiment developed that pointed to
the high Federal Reserve rediscount rate as responsible for the
sharp decline. The Federal Reserve System was accused of pursuing
a conscious program of forced liquidation. This accusation was not 
28true.
In the Ninth Federal Reserve District between 1920 and 19215 
a decrease of million in the loans and, discounts of member
2?U. S. Congress s Agricultural InquiryIX<> 87-88.
^Anderson a Federal Reserve Policymakings 26.
banks was matched by a decrease of only $12 06 million in the total
amount borrowed from the Federal Reserve bank. In addition,, the con=
tention that Federal Reserve credit was withheld from agricultural
areas was not true. While the loans and discounts of member banks in
2 9agricultural counties were reduced by $19.1 million, the total bor= 
rowing from the Federal Reserve bank in the same counties increased by 
$18„3 millions For the nation as a whole, loans and discounts of 
member banks in agricultural counties were decreased by $36.5 million 
while borrowing from Federal Reserve banks increased by $127.6 million. 
The contrast in liquidation illustrated in Table 16 shows that the 
most severe contraction took place--in the non-agricultural counties.
TABLE 16
PERCENT OF INCREASE OR DECREASE IN BORROWING FROM 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS BY MEMBER BANKS, 1920=1921
(Mil
Location
Ninth District s
Agricultural Counties 
Semiagricultural Gounties 
Nonagrieultural Counties
Total
United Statess
Agricultural Counties 
Semiagrieu.ltural Counties 
Nonagricultural Counties
Total
aS©urees U. S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry9 Hearing before 
the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, 67thCong. , 1st Sess., 
(Washington, 1922), II, 103.
2^Counties where the value of agricultural production exceeds 
80 percent of the value of total county production were classified as 
agricultural.
lions of Dollars)
Loans and Discounts Borrowing From
of Member Banks Federal Res.
- U.8 +102.2
- 6.1 - 7.It 
-12.0 =  1*6.9
- 8 .0  -  I k . 3
- 1.2 +  56.6
- 1.3 -  0.2
- 5 .6  -  28.5
- k .5  -  19.5
Uo
As the price decline of 1920 progressed,, the loans of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Minneapolis climbed steadily,, By October 1920*
31they had reached an all-time higho The Minneapolis Bank found it 
necessary to borrow from other Federal Reserve banks to meet the grow­
ing credit needs of the Ninth District. On January 1* 1921* its actual
reserve was 39 = 2 percent. Without the funds borrowed from other Fed-
32eral Reserve banks* this ratio would have been 29.7 percent.
Between 1918 and 1920* farm mortgage loans in Montana in­
creased from'7.6 percent of the total mortgage loans to 12.5 percent. 
During the same period personal and collateral loans to farmers in­
creased from 38.96 percent- to h7°72 percent of the total. These 
averages for the nation as a whole were 1|.50 percent and l|.97 percent 
respectively for farm mortgage loans and 11.17 percent and 13.29 per-
33cent respectively for personal and collateral loans to farmers. Be­
tween 1922 and 1925 the total decrease in the amount of agricultural
loans within the Ninth District was only 3.6 percent of the total or
*511.2 percent average each year.
Between February 1* 1921s and August 31* 1921* the loans of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis increased from $7.6 million 
to $13.6 million in Mantana. During 1921 the Helena Branch of the 
Minneapolis Bank loaned funds to 176 banks that totaled $32.7 million
31Mosher* Causes of Failure* 18.
12 ̂"Banking and Financial Notes*" The Bankers Magazine* LII 
(February* 1921)* 318.
■̂ U. S. Congress* Agricultural Inquiry* II* 97=98.
^Mosher* Causes of Failure. 18.
35in rediscounts and $25.2 million in collateral loans. Table 17 
illustrates the decrease of these amounts in the following years.
TABLE 17
REDISCOUNTS AND LOANS TO MEMBER BANKS IN MONTANA 
BY THE HELENA BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS BY YEARa
Nov.-'of Banks Rediscounts Loansnu
Year : .Served __ No. , Amount No. Amount
1922 165 13,777 $20,965,000 539 $7,1*05,000
1923 1 3 2' 9,21*1 ll*,183,000 260 3,8ll*,000
19214 102 14,763 5,622,000 81* 1,851,000
1925 60 1,51*5 1,551*,000 30 238,000
1926 1*8 1,507 1,055,000 63 1,053,000
aSources Letter of Clement Van Nice to John H. Toole, Dec. 8,1966.
The figures illustrated in Table 17 represent the new loans 
made and do not measure the length of loan maturity. A more meaning­
ful measure of the amount of credit supplied to Montana banks on a 
continuous basis is indicated by the average amount ©f daily borrow­
ing by member banks from the Helena Branch. The average amount of 
daily borrowing during this period wass $10,061*,000 in 1921 j ; 
$7,511,000 in 19221 $1*,803,000 in 1923? $1,917,000 in 1921*. Many 
banks were almost continuously indebted to the Federal Reserve bank 
throughout this period. Without the credit supplied by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and the Twin City correspondent banks,
a considerably larger number of banks would have been unable to with-
36stand the financial crisis.
■^Letter of Clement Van Nice to John H. Toole, Dec. 8, 1966. 
See also Groth, "Montana Banking History," 6l.
-^Letter of dement Van Nice to John H. Toole, Dec. 8, 1966.
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An examination of the consolidated balance sheet for Montana 
state and national commercial banks on June 30* 1921* shows that many 
banks were overextended. Total deposits were only $2 million more 
than total loansj the ratio of loans to deposits was 98.6 percent. 
Borrowing equaled 20 percent of deposits and about one-half of the 
banks had total loans that exceeded the amount of their deposits,
37In some cases this excess was by a large margin. The following 
condensed financial statement in Table 18 reveals this overextended 
position and shows why the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis was 
reluctant to encourage further credit extensions by lowering the 
rediscount rate. Rather than forcing a radical liquidation* the 
Federal. Reserve. Bank of Minneapolis made it possible for many Mon­
tana banks to continue carrying large amounts of overdue paper.
TABLE 18
CONDENSED STATEMENT OF CONDITION (CONSOLIDATED)a 
1*20 MONTANA BANKS 
(llf.3' NATIONAL - 27? STATE)
June 30* 1921
Assets
Loans
Investments
Cash
Other
$1^ * 000*000
27*000*000
29*000*000
10*000*000
Liabilities 
Deposits $11*6*000*000
Total $210*000*000
Borrowings 
Nat'1 Bank Notes 
Capital Accounts 
Other
Total
28*000*000 
1**000*000 
31*500*000
500,000
$210*000*000
Sources Paper presented by Clement Van Nice and Dick Heiber 
before the joint meeting ©f the Board of Directors ©f the Minneapolis 
and Helena offices ©f the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis on 
Oct. 15* 1966.
37Paper, presented by Clement Van Nice and Dick Heiber before 
the joint meeting of the Board of Directors of the Minneapolis and 
Helena offices of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis on Oct. 15* 
1966. (Copy in the possession of Dr.. K. Ross Toole* Department" of 
History* University of Montana.)
During the early phases of the 1920-1926 banking crisis the 
business cycle theoiy held by Federal Reserve officials supported a
passive policy. As the period progressed, these ideas were slowly
........ <]Q . . • -. :.•■■■modified. In 1921 the severe criticism of Federal Reserve policy
resulted in a Congressional inquiry. Hearings were held on the role
of the Federal Reserve System in the 1920 agricultural crisis. Rather
than criticizing rediscount rate increases, the.commission stated
that action should have started earlier. In their opinion, Treasury
39Department policy should not have dictated Federal Reserve actions.
Once liquidation was under way the commission felt that Federal 
Reserve policy should have been softened slightly to ease the dis­
tress caused by the deflation.^ These findings influenced the 
developing ideas about the proper role of the Federal Reserve System
in the economy. Undoubtedly it provided officials with a strong
1+1motive to explore the proper role of the System further.
It is doubtful whether lower rediscount rates would have pro­
vided a solution to Montana's difficulties. When banks are overex-
In­tended as they were in 1921, an easy credit policy is not the answer
to strengthening the position of the banking system. Further loans
by the Federal Reserve would encourage banks to make further extensions
of credit. It is clear that the Federal Reserve System did not
OQCharles 0. Hardy, Credit Policies of the Federal Reserve 
System (Washington, D. C., 1932), 1+3«
3%. S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, II, 12.
^°U. S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, II, 88.
^-Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 32.
function as a positive force to curb the deflation of the early 1920's 
to the fullest extent possible. However,, it is equally clear that it 
was not used as a tool to force a rapid liquidation upon the banking 
system. In light of the economic theory of the time, Federal Reserve 
actions were reasonable. Certainly Federal.Reserve policy cannot be 
assigned as a major factor in the Widespread wave of banking failures.
CHAPTER IV 
THE INFLUENCE OF AGRICULTURAL FACTORS
Banking operations were greatly affected by the agricultural 
conditions of the early 1920!s. The wave of bank failures that oc­
curred was in many respects a reflection of the widespread agricul­
tural distress. Montana was affected by world-wide as well as pe­
culiar local agricultural conditions during this period. As an 
area of surplus agricultural production, the general prosperity of 
the state was closely related to conditions in the.agricultural mar­
kets. Banks located in agricultural regions were heavily dependent 
upon farm prosperity and generally lacked the financial strength of 
the larger city banks. As conditions in agriculture began to de­
teriorate following the First World War, the situation was quickly 
reflected in the banking system. Therefore, agricultural conditions 
during the early 1920's were an important part of the bank failure 
pattern and as such require further examination.
Between 1900 and 1920 the general position of agriculture 
in the economy continually improved in the United States. Demand 
for agricultural products increased more rapidly than production. 
Between 1899 and 1909, agricultural production increased 10 percent 
while population increased 21.5 percent. Between 1909 and 1919, 
agricultural production increased 10.5 percent while population in­
creased lit.5 percent.'*' This large increase of demand for agricultural
"V S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, lit.
U5
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products in relation to its production resulted in a period of agri­
cultural prosperity8
The First World War created a period of great demand for 
agricultural products. United States exports of crude foodstuffs
increased from $138 million in 19lU to a total in 1920 of $918 
2milliono However, agricultural production responded slowly to the 
increased war demand. It was not until after the armistice that 
production increased significantly. The agricultural production 
index (1935“1939=100) shows the slow change in output that took 
places 98 in 1915s 92 in 19l6j 90 in 1917 J 95 in 1918j 96 in 1919j 
101 in 1920.3
The result of the increased demand and slowly expanding 
agricultural supply was a sharp price increase. Wheat prices rose 
to over $2.50 per bushel, The index of farm prices (1909=191^=100) 
reached 200 in 1918 while the price index was 175 for necessary farm 
purchases.^ Farmers enjoyed a relative increase in their purchasing 
power. As a result of this situation, the average net income of 
farmers between 1915 and 1919 rose from $U,395 to $9,877. This 
farm prosperity was largely the result of high farm prices.
Q . . .George Soulf, Economic Forces in American History (n.p., 
1953), 37iu Cited hereafter as Soule, Economic Forces.
^Ibid.
^August C, Bolino, The Development of the American Economy; 
(Columbus, Ohio, 1961), 339.
^Soule, Economic Forces, 375.
The nature of the increased agricultural production in the 
Northwest states^ led to some post-war difficulties. Expansion in
t
the production of food grains during the war left the area heavily 
dependent upon the market condition for these grains. In the years 
following the end of the.war, export demand for wheat declined 
sharply. Although income in the United States was high during this 
period, demand for food grains did not increase in the same propor­
tion. Increasing incomes were reflected in greater demand for such 
food products as fresh fruits and vegetables, fresh meats and poul­
try, and dairy products the demand for food grains did not expand 
to the same extent. Declining grain exports were matched by the
inability of the domestic market to absorb the increased production
7of food grains at prevailing prices. The Northwest states, heavily 
dependent upon wheat production, were unable to take advantage of 
the post-war increases in income. It was during this critical 
period that wheat production in Montana, as illustrated by Table 19, 
increased rapidly.
TABLE 19
TOTAL WHEAT THRASHED IN MONTANA 
IN SELECTED YEARS, l899-192Ua
. Date Acres Bushels
,' 1899 92,132 1,899,683
1909 2^8,377 6,251s9bB
1919 1,698,531 7,799j>61i7
192U . 3,102,879 iiU,058,012
clSources U. S. Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the 
United Statest 1930» Agriculture, II, Pt. 3, ll6.
Includes Montana, North and South Dakota, and Minnesota.
7'McCracken, Northwest in Two Wars, 11-12.
1*8.
Between 1900 and 1920 the population of Montana increased 
rapidly. New lands were opened during this period of agricultural 
prosperity and settlers poured into the area. Table 20 shows that 
the number of farms in the state increased even more rapidly than 
the population. . During the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, agriculture expanded rapidly in Montana.
The increased agricultural demand of the First World War 
led to a large increase in.the amount of land devoted to agricul­
ture in Montana. Between 1910 and 1920 the total area in farm 
land increased from 13.5 to 35.1 million acres.. During the same 
period the value of farm land and buildings increased from $251.6
Qmillion to $776.8 million.
TABLE 20
CHANGES IN POPULATION AND NUMBER . OF FARMS 
IN MONTANA, 1880-1930
Percent of No. of Percent of
Year Population Increase farms Increase
1880 39A$9 90.1 1,519 78.5
1890 ll*2,92l* 265.0 5,603 268.9
1900 21*3,329 70.3 13,370 138.6
1910 376,053 514.5 26,211* 96.1
1920 5U8,889 1*6.0 57,677 120.0
1930 536,332 -2.3 1*6,901* -18.7
clSources Curtis L. Mosher, The Causes of Failure In the- North­
western. States (Minneapolis, 1930), 28. — —  — —
In the Northwest states the amount of cultivated land increased 
16 2 /3 percent while production increased only 5 percent during the war.
QU. S. Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United 
Statess 1930. Agriculture, II, Pt. 3,~"ll6. Cited hereafter as Bureau 
of the Census, Fifteenth Census; 1930, Agriculture.
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It is apparent from these figures that agricultural expansion had ad-
9vanced'into marginal and submarginal lands. Much of this new farm 
land in Montana was suitable Only for "dry land" farming--a type of 
farming that required a considerable amount of farming skill and ex­
perience. Farm failures were inevitable with the settlement of these 
areas by people with little farming background and experience. A
1923 study of areas of heavy farm failures in Montana revealed the
/results of this indiscriminate settlement. Of the farmers who failed,,
5l percent had no previous farming experience and 30 percent had no 
10capital. This lack of farming experience was an important factor 
in the widespread farm failures in Montana.
Peculiar local conditions added to the difficulties of Mon­
tana farmers. Drought conditions began during the summer of 1917 
and crops during that year were generally poor. Different areas 
were affected in different ways during the following years. How­
ever,, drought conditions were generally a serious problem to farmers 
throughout the state. Rainfall in Shelby during 1916 was 10.26 
inches. During the following years it declined rapidlys 9*96 inches 
in 1917| 8.88 inches in 19l8| 6.86 inches in 1919. In 1919 Havre 
received only 8.80 inches of rain and only 7.7lt inches fell in Glas­
gow.11 The effect of the drought on wheat production was serious.
From an average of 20 bushels an acre between 1010 and 19l65
^Moshers Causes of Failure, 6.
10Ibid.9 0.
■^Toole9 Uncommon Land, 230.
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production averages, in 191? fell to 2 1*/10 bushels per acre. At
12prevailing prices this meant a $50 million loss to Montana.
Table 21 illustrates the decline that took place in agricultural pro­
ductivity.
TABLE 21
AVERAGE NUMBER OF BUSHEL YIELD PER ACRE IN MONTANA 
FOR SELECTED CROPS5 1909 AND 1919a
Product 1909 1919
Wheat 21*.2 I4.6
Hay and Forage (tons) -.1.1*9 0.83
Com 28.8 8.5
Oats 1*1 <1* 13.5
Barley 27 . 6 11.8
Rye 18.1* 3.0
Flax Seed 11.9 2.5
aSource; U. S. Bureau of the Census^ Fourteenth Census of 
the United States; 1920. Agricultures II3 Pt. 3* 101*.
Conditions continued to place the farmer in a serious position. 
Many farmers were unable to meet their payments on their bank loans 
and many loans were renewed. In 1918 farmers borrowed heavily to 
plant crops2 the drought continued and drops were poor. Drought con­
ditions continued into 1919 and many streams dried up to their head- 
13springs. Throughout these years harvests were small and feed was 
scarce. To compound the difficultiesa winter began early in .1919 and 
lasted until May of the following year. Feed for livestock had to be 
shipped in and by spring ranchers had expended $1*5 million to save
"̂ Toole., Uncommon Land., 235-36.
-^Annual Report of the Banking Department a 1921* j 11.
£
their herds. As summer approached, livestock that had survived the
severe winter were faced with bare ranges. At the same time the
price of beef began to decline sharply and stockmen found that their
livestock was worth less than their maintenance cost through the winter.
lU .Many prosperous stockmen were ruined.
Poor agricultural conditions continued. In 1920 Montana ex- 
perienced its fourth successive crop failure. Declining prices and 
poor crops led to a strain on banks that had already stretched their
1*3credit capacity to carry farmers through the past four years. This 
overextension of credit by Montana banks led to serious difficulties. 
For five years Montana crops failed to yield any return above the 
cost of production. Banks continued-to grant renewals and extensions 
since foreclosure was the only other alternative.' Since land values 
had declined sharply, such a course of action generally was not a 
practical solution... Banks were soon in a difficult position as loans 
increased and deposits decreased. Banks borrowed to meet deposit 
withdrawals and pledged assets as security for the loans. As the 
downward spiral continued, bank assets continued to depreciate in 
value. The situation resulted in a widespread wave of bank failures 
as banks began to ’'fall by sheer exhaustion.1
The sharp price declines of 1920 added difficulties t© the 
already serious agricultural situation. When world purchasing power
litAnnual Report of the Banking Department, 192k s 11. See also 
Mosher, Causes■of Failure, 10-11.
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began to decline following the First World War, the export demand for 
American agricultural products began to fade* As agricultural prices 
declined, the purchasing power of the agricultural eQmmunity--nearly 
lj.0 percent of the total— began to decline. The impact of this de­
cline resulted in a decrease of demand for industrial products and an
17increase in unemployment. Between 1919 and 1921 a decline from 215 
to 12JU took place in the price index for farm products. At the same 
time the price index fell from 202 to 152 for items that farmers pur­
chased. As a result of these changes, farmers in 1921 could purchase 
only three-quarters as much with their current income as they could 
before the war. Between 1919 and 1921 the gross farm income in the 
United States declined from $17,710 million to $10,14.78 million. The
relationship of farm income to farm expenses did not recover its
1 ft1910-191U level until the Second World War.
The price declines that vitally affected Montana in 1920 were 
closely related to world-wide conditions. The sharp declines were 
not' caused by overproduction or overmarketing in the United States. 
However, the decline of export demand for agricultural products was 
an important factor. Since agricultural products generally are pro­
duced in surplus quantities in the United States, a small change in 
-export demand exerts a great influence on domestic prices. . Unless
excess production is absorbed by exports it tends to depress agricul- 
19tural prices. The price decline of 1920 was largely the result of 
this situation.
17U. S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, 17.
-^Soule, Economic Forces s 377.
^U. S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, 1,5.
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The extent of the price decline of 1920 was a major factor in
determining the farm prosperity of the early 1920's. In 1921 the index
of selected farm product prices (1909“19lU=100) revealed the sharp
declines that had taken places wheat, 78j beef cattle, 71| sheep, 6U|
20wool, 63j average of 31 selected agricultural products, 67. By 1921
the purchasing power of the farmer's dollar was 76 cents in terms of 
211913 dollars. This was the lowest point it had reached in thirty 
22years.
The value of agricultural land is a useful index to measure 
farm prosperity. The value of farm land generally increased while 
farm prices were high and future prospects were bright. As farmers 
prospered,, savings were reinvested in additional land— the tradi­
tional pattern followed by American farmers. Between 1910 and 1920
the average value of farm land in the United States rose from $19.81
23to $69.38 per acre. In the four Northwest states, farm land values
. 2 k-increased between 1915 and 1920 by 75 percent. Bankers shared the 
optimism of the period and the rise in farm land value reflected the 
overextension of bank credit.
Farm mortgage debt expanded rapidly. This large increase 
was the product of the First World War land boom. Mortgage amounts 
increased more rapidly than either the value of farm land and
20U« S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, 31.
21Ibid., 28.
• 22I M d ., 13„
21-'Boule, Economic Forces, 375.
^McCracken, Northwest in Two Wars, 3.
51+
buildings or farm.production. The increase of farm mortgage debt 
illustrated by Table 22 is striking. In Montana the percentage of 
owned farms mortgaged increased rapidly: 15.6 percent in 1890j
25li+.O percent in 1900j 21.1 percent in I9IO3 61+.6 percent in 1920.
The average rate of interest paid on these farm mortgages was 
7.6 percent. This increased cost of farm operation created an 
additional financial burden in the following years. Payment of 
interest on this inflated debt structure required a disproportionate 
part of current farm income. This decline in farm purchasing power 
for goods and services further depressed business activity.
TABLE 22
TOTAL FARM MORTGAGE DEBT OF OWNERS OPERATING 
THEIR OWN FARMS5 1910-1920a
Area 1910 1920 .
Minnesota $7738663283 $251+,1+75,222
North Dakota 1+8,81+1,58? 108,281+,682
South Dakota 32,771,359 903082,31+6
MONTANA IO37I+I328O 777,91+9,679
Total— Northwest States $169,220,509 $530,791,929
Total.— United States $1,726,200,000 $1+,012,700,000
aSource: Curtis L. Mosher, The Causes of Banking Failure in
the Northwestern States (Minneapolis, 1930), 28. ""
Commercial banks assumed an active role in the expansion of 
the farm mortgage debt. Banks became a center for farm land trans­
actions and bankers became involved in profitable land speculations.
S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, 206.
26Ibid., 208.
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As an active participant in speculative land transactions, the banker •'
2?was not in a position to urge a conservative view of farm land values. 
Farmers with first mortgages found it relatively easy to obtain funds 
to expand operations by giving a second mortgage. Bank officers often 
encouraged land purchases through low down-payment requirements and 
easy repayment.terms. . Unsecured notes often were accepted for the' 
balance due on land purchases. The subsequent criticism by bank ex­
aminers generally forced the conversion of these notes into second 
mortgages. With the collapse of farm land values in 1920, banks
found themselves holding large amounts of worthless second mortgages
28representing an equity in unsalable land. Banks often held port­
folios that were overburdened with slow and frozen earning assets.
The debt burden created during the years preceding 1920 had 
a disastrous.?: effect on farmers after the sharp price declines.
Falling agricultural prices made it difficult for farmers to meet 
payments on mortgage debts and to purchase necessary supplies. Farm 
debt had more than doubled during the 1910-1920 periods the price
29declines of 1920 had the effect of again doubling this farm debt.
As a result, farm foreclosures as a percentage of the total number
of farms increased rapidly in the United States i .1+ percent during the
war; 1 .2 percent in 1922; 1 .5 percent in 1923j 1 .7 percent in 192lt.
The proportion of farm bankruptcies to the total bankruptcies in the
30country rose from 7 to l8:ipercent.
27Mosher, Causes of Failure, 16.
28Ibid., 16-17.
2^U. S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, 20.
■̂ Soule,. Economic Forces, 377.
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In Montana the tragedy was even more striking than the nation­
wide experience. The average value of farm land and buildings de­
clined between 1920 and 1925 from $22.15 to $13.91 per acre.^ The
total value of farm land and buildings declined from $776 <,76? <>529 to
32$ 1 * 5 5 8 8 7  in the state. During a period of highly inflated farm
debt based on high land values, such, a decline inevitably affected the
banking operations of the area.
The combination of these agricultural factors was an important
part of the bank failure story in Montana during the early 1920’s.
Indeed, the Superintendent of Banking in Montana attributed Montana’s
financial crisis to three causes; "Deflation, Drouth and the High
33Tastes of its people." The first two factors refer to the agricul­
tural situation during this period. Rapidly falling farm prices and 
farm income were faced by a highly inflated farm debt situation.
Local drought conditions and an economy that produced agricultural 
goods that were insensitive to rising national income left Montana 
in a difficult position. Banks of the area were generally small 
banks that lacked financial diversification. Generally, they were 
small rural institutions that were closely tied to the local farm 
economy. With the drastic agricultural crisis of the early 1920’s, 
many banks were unable to withstand the resulting financial pres­
sures. The widespread wave of bank failures in Montana during the 
1920's was in part a reflection of this agricultural distress.
3%. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Agriculture;
Montanas Counties and State Economic Areas (Washington, D. C., 1956), 2.
32Uo S. Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Censuss 1930, Agri­
culture, 116.
33Annual Report of the Banking Department, 1922., 13.
CHAPTER V
FINANCIAL STRENGTH AS A FACTOR IN BANK FAILURES
Changes of financial account balances during the 1920-1926 
period were an important part of the bank failure pattern in Mon­
tana. An examination of these account balances reveals many of 
the financial weaknesses that were an important factor in bank 
failures. Changes in balance sheet account balances may reveal 
the success of bank management in meeting the unforeseen difficul­
ties of this period. Such changes in accounts provide a useful 
picture of banking operations in Montana as banks struggled for 
survival during the early 1920's.
The division of Montana banks into failing and non-failing 
categories used in Chapter II can be utilized to examine some of 
the differences that existed in the account balances of these two 
groups. For this purpose a comparative balance sheet has been 
constructed in Table 23 that includes both failing and non-failing 
banks. Further detail is provided in Table 2k and Table 25 for 
national and state banks in Montana. A comparison of the percen­
tage columns of these statements reveals the differences that 
existed in 1920 between these two groups of banks.
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TABI£L23
COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET FOR FAILING AND NON-FAILING 
COMMERCIAL BANKS IN MONTANA IN 1920a
Failing Non-Failing
Amount Percent Amount Percent
ASSETS (millions) of Total (millions) of Total
Loans* Discounts*
Overdrafts 
Bonds, Investments* $65.1 75. h
$79.8 6lu7
Real Estate 9.6 11.1 18.8 15.2
Legal Reserve 3.9 li.5 8.7 7.0Other Assets 7.7 9.0 16 .0 13.1
Total $86.3 100.0 $123.3 100.0
LIABILITIES
Demand Deposits $29.5 3U.1 $U9.3 Uo.oTime Deposits 25.5 29.5 39.8 32.2Other Liabilities 19.3 22.U 16.9 13.7
Total $7U.3 86.0 $106.0 85.9
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS
Capital
Surplus and Undivided $8.5 9.9
$10.1 8.2
Profit 3.5 U.l 7.2- 5.9
Total $12.0 1U.0 $17.3 lk.l
Total $86.3 100.0 $123.3 100.0
aCalcuiated from individual balance sheet statement of nation­
al banks on Sept. 8, 1920* included in the Annual Report of the Comp­
troller' of the Currency. State bank statements are taken’on Nov. 15s 
1920* from the Annual Report of the Banking Department in Montana.
Only banks in business on these dates are included.
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TABLE 2i*
COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET FOR FAILING AND NON-FAILING 
COMMERCIAL STATE BANKS IN MONTANA3,
November 15* 1920
Failing Non-Failing
Amount Percent Amount Percent
ASSETS (thousands) of Total (thaii&ahds) of Total
Loans, Discounts $257.3 80.5 $3U0.7 68.8Overdrafts
Bonds and Warrants 16.1* 5.1 53.1* 10.8
Legal Reserve 17.6 5.5 53.5 10.8
Due from Other Banks 12v8 .9 9.6 1.9Other Real Estate 3.7 1.2 l*.o .8
Other Assets 21.6 6.8 3l*»6 6.9
Total $319.1* 100.0 $1*95.8 100.0
LIABILITIES
Bills Payable $58.9 1 8.1* $38.9 7.9
Due to Banks 5.1* 1.7 13.8 2.8
Demand Deposits 108.8 31*.1 197.6 39.9
Time Deposits 96.1 30.1 171.5 31*.6
Other Liabilities 1.8 .5 .1* .1
Total $271.0 81*. 8 $1*22.2 85.3
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS
Capital $35.9 11.2 $1*7.5 9.6Surplus 8.9 2.8 16.7 3.3Undivided Profits 3.6 1.2 9.1*. 1.8
Total $1*8.1* 15.2 $73.6 11*-. 7
Total $319.1* 100.0 $1*95.8 100.0
aCaleulated from individual balance sheet statement of state 
banks: on Nov. 15, 1920, taken from the Annual Report of the Banking 
Department in Montana, Only banks in business on that date are in­
cluded.
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TABLE 25
COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET FOR FAILING AND NON-FAILING 
COMMERCIAL NATIONAL BANKS IN MONTANA*
September 8, 1920
ASSETS
Failing Non-Failing
Amount Percent Amount Percent
(thousands) of Total (thousands) of Total
Loans, Discounts, 
Overdrafts 
U. S. Government 
Securities 
Other Investments 
and Real Estate 
Legal Reserve with 
Federal Reserve 
Other Assets
Total
$392.8 69.9 $602.2 61. u
U2.U 7.5 83.5 8.5
5o.h 9.0 96.0 9.8
18.6 3.3 38.6 3.8
58.3 10.3 162.5 16.5
$562.5 100.0 $982.8 100.0
LIABILITIES
Demand Deposits $193.5 3U.1* $39h.7 1*0.2
Time Deposits 162. u 28.9 296.8 30.2
Other Liabilities 13U.9 2J4.0 161.3 16. 1*
Total $U90.8 87.3 $852,8 86.8
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS
Capital
Surplus and Undivided
$1*7.8 8.5 68.7 7.0
Profits 23.9 1*.2 61.3 6.2
Total $71.7 12.7 $130.0 13.2
Total $562.5 100.0 $982.8 100.0
clCalculated from, individual balance sheet statements of na­
tional banks on Sept. 8, 1920, included in the Annual Report of the 
Comptroller of the Currency. Only banks in business on this date 
are included.
6l
Generally, differences in account balances between the two 
groups of banks were small. Failing banks held a larger percentage 
of their assets in the form of loans and discounts than non-failing 
banks. Investments accounted for a smaller percentage of the total 
assets of failing banks. Failing banks held a smaller percentage 
of their liabilities as demand and time deposits than non-failing 
banks. The capital accounts were about the same for both groups. 
These differences, although not striking or large, indicate a ten­
dency for failing banks to be more heavily extended in loans than 
non-failing banks; the source of these funds were less deposits 
than other liabilities.
Important account balance changes took place throughout 
the early 19201s. 'An examination of these changes in account bal­
ances and of financial ratios during this period provides some in­
sight into the financial strength of the banking system. A compari­
son of Montana banks with the averages for the United States as a 
whole, provides a basis for evaluation of financial position.'*' It 
should be noted that as banks failed, they were eliminated from the 
statistics of active banks upon which these comparisons are based. 
Therefore, as the period progressed, the amounts increasingly tended 
to represent the stronger banks that had survived the-crisis. Rec­
ognizing this fact, the account balances and ratios are still valu­
able in determining the changes that occurred in the banking system 
during this period.
■̂ A desirable comparison would be of failing and non-failing 
banks in Montana throughout the early 1920's. However, statements 
for state banks are published by the state Banking Department and 
for national banks by the Comptroller of the Currency. Since state­
ment' dates vary widely for these two groups, it was impractical to 
construct a comparison on this basis.
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The amount of total resources of a commercial bank is an im­
portant consideration in determining its financial strength. Nor­
mally., the amount of total resources of a healthy growing bank will 
increase. During periods of increasing total resources, the greatest 
gains generally are made by non-failing banks. Decreasing total re­
sources are more common for failing banks as a group than for non- 
failing commercial banks. - An examination of Table 26 shows that 
the total resources of Montana banks increased more slowly during 
periods of increase and fell more rapidly during periods of decline 
than the nation-wide bank averages. Generally, this indicates that 
Montana banks were in a less favorable financial condition. However, 
this factor cannot be considered in isolation of other account bal­
ances | it is only one consideration.
„'' i V O'. .t:\oas of . o> . :
\ TABLE 26
CHANGES IN THE TOTAL RESOURCES OF STATE AND 
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS IN MONTANA 
AND.,1 THE 'UNITED STATES, 19l8-192?a
Montana United States
Amount Percent of Amount Percent of
Year (millions) Change (millions) Change
1918 $202.3 $36,3521919 223.7 +11 1*2,1*62 +16
1920 23U.9 + 5 1*7,509 +12
1921 210.1 -11 1*3,669 - 8
1922 197.6 - 6 1*1*.,106 + 1
1923 187.6 - 5 1*7,332 + 71921* 11*7.2 -22 50,137 + 6
1925 160.6 + 9, 51*.,1*02 + 9
1926 163.2 + 3 56,781 + 1*1927 170.1* + 3 5^,973 + 1*
aSouree s Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statisticss
United States, 1896-1955» Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (Washington, D. C., 1959), 38-1*5, 606-613 passim.
ÔHorace Secrist, National Bank Failures and Non-Failures3 An 
Autopsy and Diagnosis (Bloomington, Indiana, 1938), 11. Cited hereafter 
as.Secrist, National Bank Failures.
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The operations of a commercial hank are sustained by the earn­
ings of its assets. The most important of these are the loans and 
discounts and the investments held by the bank for income purposes. 
Therefore* changes in these account balances are of primary importance 
to any assessment of financial strength. Generally* a significant de­
cline in the earning assets of a bank is a sign of financial weakness.
Failing banks tend to experience larger declines in their earning as-
3sets than non-failing banks. An examination of Table 2? shows that 
the earning assets of Montana banks increased slower during periods 
of growth and declined faster during periods of decrease than the 
nation-wide averages. Generally* these figures indicate that Montana 
banks were in a less favorable financial position than those of the 
nation as a whole.
TABLE 27
CHANGES IN TOTAL EARNING ASSETS OF STATE AND 
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS IN MONTANA 
AND THE UNITED STATES* 19l8-1927a
Montana United States
Amount Percent of Amount Percent of
Year (millions) Ghange (mi.lll.ons) Change
1918 $153.8 $28*050 \ ‘
1919 167.8 + 9  32*335 +15
1920 189.5 +13 36*960 +1.1*
1921 170.6 -10 3k?7k6 - 6
1922 155.8 - 9 3i1.5i1.OO - 1.
1923 11*6.6 - 6 37 .>722 +10
1921* 105.6 -28 38*957 + 3
1925 • 118.2 +12 1*1*978 + 8
1926 123.9 + 5 1*1*. *308 + 6
1927 130.2 + 5 1*6*097 + 1*
aSources Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statistics % 
United States* l896-1955fl Board of Governors ofTEe Federal Reserve 
System (Washington* D. C.* 1959)* 38-1*5* 606-613 passim.
^Secrist* National Bank Failures. 13.
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Deposits left with a bank are a major source of funds for bank 
investment. Since these funds are invested largely in customer loans 
and other earning assets, a continued or sudden decline of this ac­
count places the bank in a difficult financial position. Most bank 
assets cannot be converted into cash immediately. Therefore, sudden 
declines place the bank in an embarrassing position since quick liqui­
dation of assets often involves a loss to the bank. A more gradual 
but continual decline in deposits results in a decrease of earning 
assets and "starvation" of the bank. It is apparent, therefore, that 
failing banks tend more often to have declining deposit totals than
h  nnon-failing banks. Table 28 indicates the changes that occurred in 
total deposits during the early 1920's. Generally, total deposits 
of Montana banks increased at a slower rate and decreased more rapid­
ly than the nation-wide averages. These changes indicate that Mon- 
tana banks were in a less favorable financial position.
Changes in the capital accounts do not always reflect a change 
in the banks" financial strength. The amount of capital funds needed 
by a bank depends upon such factors as the volume of bank business, 
size of deposits and other liabilities, the liquidity of the banks 
earning assets, and other factors. However, the surplus account is 
of some importance as a reflection of bank earnings. Profits not dis­
tributed to owners are eventually added to this accountj operating 
losses are eventually charged to the surplus account. In this sense, 
the changes that take place in the capital accounts are of some im­
portance. The adequacy of capital'account balances can only be 
hSecrist, National Bank Failures, 12.
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judged in relationship to other accounts. Generally failing banks ex­
perienced larger decreases in their capital account balances than non- 
5failing banks. Table 29 indicates the changes that took place in 
capital account balances during this period.
TABLE 28
CHANGES IN THE TOTAL DEPOSITS OF STATE AND 
■ NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS IN MONTANA 
AND THE UNITED STATES3 19l8-1927a
Montana United States
Amount Percent of Amount Percent of
Year (millions) Change (millions) Change
1918 $157.1+ $28P708
1919 181.3 +15 33*251+ +16
1920 172.2 - 5 36a682 +10
1921 11+6.2 »15 33*1+31 - 91922 138.2 - 6 35*533 + 6
1923 H+1.3 + 2 38s175 + 7
1921+ 119.1+ -16 1+1 *1+1+3 + 9
1925 136.7 +15 1+5*230 + 91926 11+2.1 + U I+65951 + 1+
1927 11+8.0 + 1+ I+8570I+ + 1+
aSsurces Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statistics; 
United States» 1896-1955a Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (Washington^ D. C. <, 1959)* 38-1+5* 6o6-6l3 passim.
A ratio used to determine the adequacy of capital funds is the 
total capital funds to total deposits ratio. Conventional thought 
during the 1920*s maintained that a 10 percent minimum was necessary 
for operating safety. The conclusions of a study of failing national 
banks during this period indicates that this general rule was false. 
Generally5 ratios were lower for non-failing banks in the study than 
for failing banks. The 10 percent rule is illusoryj 5U percent of 
the failing banks included in the study had ratios in excess of
^Secrist* National Bank Failures;, lit
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20 percent.^ This relationship is demonstrated in Table 30 by the 
comparison of Montana and nation-wide bank averages. Montana banks 
failed at a higher rate than the average for the United States, yet 
the Montana ratios of total capital accounts to deposits were higher 
than the nation-wide averages. The conclusion drawn from this rela­
tionship is that the margin provided by owners in the form of capital 
is never sufficient to cover the liabilities of the bank. Its pur­
pose is to establish customer confidence and if this confidence is 
disturbed, the amount of capital is not sufficient to offset rapid 
deposit withdrawals. In this case it would take more than a high 
ratio of total capital funds to total deposits to restore the bank's 
financial position.
TABLE 29
CHANGES IN THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT BALANCES OF STATE AND 
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS IN MONTANA 
AND THE UNITED STATES, 19l8-1927a
Montana United States
Year
Amount 
(millions)
Percent of 
Change
Amount 
(millions)
Percent of 
Change
1918 $28.7 $k,7k3 ■
1919 30.5 + 6 5,01k 4- 61920 32.5 + 6 5,599 +121921 31.k - 3 5,936 + 61922 29.7 - 5 6,Ok3 + 2
1923 27.k - 8 6,220 + 3192k 19.5 -29 6,k21 + 3
1925 18.8 - k 6,637 + 31926 1 8.k - 2 7,022 + 6
1927 18.2- - 1 7,392 + 5
aSouree 2 Calculated from statistics in All.-Bank Statisticss 
United States3 1896-19550 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System. (Washington, D„ C., 1959), 38-k5, 606-6x3 passim.
Secrist, National Bank Failures, 18-19.
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TABLE 30
CHANGES IN THE RATIO OF TOTAL CAPITAL FUNDS TO TOTAL 
DEPOSITS FOR STATE AND NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS 
IN MONTANA AND THE UNITED STATES3 19l8-1927a
i
Year Montana United States
1918 .182 .165
1919 .168 .150
1920 .188 .152
.1921 .211* .177
1922 .215 .170
1923 .19b .16%
1921* .163 .iSii
1925 .137 .lli6
1926 .129 .llj.9
1927 .123 .151
aSources Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statistics; 
United States ■> 1896-̂ 1955 a Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (Washingtona D. C.5 1959)3 38-ii5.? 606-613 passim.
The same relationship exists between total capital funds and 
total liabilities that prevailed in the comparison with total deposits. 
Table 31 illustrates the relationship of these accounts as they exis- 
ted during the early 1920's.
TABLE 31
CHANGES IN THE RATIO OF,TOTAL CAPITAL FUNDS TO TOTAL 
LIABILITIES FOR STATE AND NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS 
IN MONTANA AND THE UNITED STATES,, 19l8-1927a
Year Montana United States
1918 .165 .150
1919 .157 .1331920 .160 .1331921 .175 .1571922 .176 .158
1923 .171 .151192U .153 .11*6
1925 .132 .138
1926 .125 .liil
1927 .119 .11*3
aSource2 Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statistics
United States 3 1896-19559 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (Washington> D. C . 5 1959) 5 38-1i55 606-613 passim.
• ̂ Secristg National Bank Failuresj 18-19.
A comparison of total loans and discounts to total deposits 
indicates the extent that funds are invested in the form of loans.
The total amount of loans is often difficult to decrease significant” 
ly in a short period of time without injuring the customers of the 
bank-and therefore the local economy. Loans are a relatively il- 
liquid form of bank investment. It is because of this characteristic 
that banks , heavily overextended in loans, experienced financial dif­
ficulties during the periods of rapid deposit withdrawals. Generally,
failing banks have a higher ratio of total loans and discounts to
8total deposits than non-failing banks. Table 32 shows that this 
relationship was true in the comparison of Montana banks with the 
nation-wide averages. Indeed, in 1921 the ratio approached 100 percent 
in Montana as loans failed to decline as rapidly as deposits. This 
situation began to change during the later years of the period as 
bank failures declined in Montana.
The ratio of total .deposits to total resources -provides 
another important indication of banking strength. Successful, bank­
ing operations depend to a.great extent on a bank's ability to at­
tract deposits and to profitably invest these funds. The higher 
the proportion of deposits to total resources, the higher the 
leverage factor and therefore the profitability to the bank owners. 
Generally, failing banks have a relatively low ratio of total deposits 
to total resources.^ This situation, as illustrated by Table 33<> was 
true in Montana during the severe wave of .bank failures during the 
early 1920ss.
^Secrist, National Bank Failures. X$-l6.
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TABLE 32
CHANGES IN THE RATIO OF TOTAL LOANS AND DISCOUNTS 
TO TOTAL DEPOSITS FOR STATE AND NATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL BANKS IN MONTANA AND 
THE UNITED STATES., 1918-192?a
Year Montana United States
1918 .827 .716
1919 .753 .6861920 .9U3 .778
1921 .985 .7891922 .961* .701*
1923 .81*7 .717
192h .65 7 .682
1925 .576 .6681926 .567 .683
1927 .566 .676
aSourees Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statisticss 
United States9 1896-1955? Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (Washington*, D. C.,, 1959)5 38“l*5j>, 606-613 passim.
These relationships indicate that Montana commercial banks 
generally were financially weaker than the nation-wide bank averages. 
This .'.is 5 to some degree 3 an indication of management1 s failure to 
meet the financial crisis that faced them. The account balances indi­
cate the financial weaknesses that made it difficult for Montana banks 
to withstand the severe crisis that faced them.
One' of the most severe problems that faced Montana bankers 
during this period was the sharp decline of deposits and their inabil­
ity to contract their assets in proportion to these increasing cash 
demands. This factor is pointed to by Federal Reserve officials as an 
important cause of nation-wide bank failures during this period.^ In 
Montana this situation was complicated by an inflow of deposit funds 
from other states during the years preceding the 1920 crisis. Farm
^Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 1926, 13.
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mortgages carried high interest rates and enabled Montana banks to pay 
relatively high interest rates on deposits. With the sharp declines 
in farm land values in 19205 Easterners became alarmed and began to 
withdraw their funds from Montana banks. The difficulty that this
11action created was the conversion of earning assets quickly into cash.
In addition to this difficulty5 many banks had sold farm mortgages to
investors with a guarantee provision for the payment of the principal
and interest on the mortgage. As payments were suspended during the
crisisP mortgage holders began to demand that banks fulfill their
12guarantee obligations. Table 3U shows the volume of funds between 
1920 and 1921 that left Northwest banks.
TABLE 33
CHANGES IN THE RATIO OF TOTAL DEPOSITS TO TOTAL 
RESOURCES FOR STATE AMD NATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
BANKS IN MONTANA AND THE UNITED STATES. 
19l8-1927a
Year Montana United States
1918 .777 .78 9
1919 .810 .783
1920 .732 .772
1921 .696 .765
1922 .699 .805
1923 .753 .806
192k .811 .826
1925 .8£l .8311926 .860 .826
1927 .868 .825
aSource s Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statisticss
United Statesa 1896-19553 Board of Governors' of the Federal Reserve 
System (Washington P D. C»5 1959)$ 38-U5ji 606-613 passim.
"^Paul W. McCrackenp The Future of Northwest Bank Depositsp 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (Minneapolisp 19U6) 5 3.
12Mosher3 Causes of Failurea 8-11.
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TABLE 3U
FUNDS LEAVING NORTHWEST STATES, 1920-1921a
Amount Percent of Total
State (millions) Assets 6/30/20
MONTANA $ 32 lL
Minnesota 150 12
North Dakota 57 22
South Dakota 66 20
Total $305 15
aSource; Paul W, McCracken, The Northwest In Two Wars, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (Minneapolis, n. d.), 7. !
As deposits declined, loss of confidence by bank,depositors be­
came a factor. The failure of a hank often frightened depositors of 
other banks into withdrawing their funds. This loss of confidence was 
indicated by a decline of $30 million in the deposits of Montana banks 
during a period when a net decrease of only two banks took place. . The 
Assistant.Federal Reserve Agent of the Minneapolis Bank insisted that 
enough money had been withdrawn and "hidden out" to restore the de­
clining deposits of all of Montana's agricultural banks.^
The situation became a vicious circle. As business activity 
declined, bank deposits were withdrawn to pay bills and purchase 
necessary items. With the decline of deposits, banks were forced to 
contract loans which further depressed business activity. In addition 
to liquidating their loans, banks were forced to borrow from corres­
pondent banks and the Federal Reserve bank to meet the financial de­
mands. The entire situation was one of overextended banks generally 
unable to meet the financial crisis. The financial weakness of
■̂ Groth,. "Montana Banking History," L5.
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Montana banks during this period was certainly an important factor in 
the failure of the banking system to meet the conditions that faced 
it. The widespread wave of bank failures reflected this financial 
condition.
CHAPTER VI
SIZE AS A FACTOR IN BANK FAILURES
The size of the commercial bank was an important factor in its 
ability to withstand the financial pressures of the 1920-1926 period. 
Although increased size did not always indicate increased financial 
strength., the larger banks generally enjoyed a greater degree of finan­
cial stability. Generally, small banks failed more often than the 
larger banks. This relationship was true whether the size of the bank 
was measured by capitalization, amount of total resources, or the 
amount of the bank’s total deposits.'*' This relations,hip was true on 
both the nation-wide level and in Montana. Of the nation-wide bank
failures in 192U and 192$, I4.O percent of the banks had capital of less
2than $2$,000 and 70 percent had less than $$0,000 in capital. In 
1926 the average capital account balance of ill failing banks in the 
United States was $3$,000 and $288,000 in total deposits. At the 
same time the nation-wide averages for all banks were $116,000 in capi- 
tal and $1,900,000 in deposits. For the nation as a whole, failing 
banks during the early 1920’s were generally small institutions.
In Montana, the same relationship between size and failure 
rate was true. Banks with capitalization of less than $30,000 ac- ^
counted for 73*9 percent of the failing banks and $8 .8 percent of the 
non-failing banks examined. Banks with total resources of less than
~*~Supra, Tables 6 , 1, 8.
2Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 192$, 32.
3Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 19269 12.
$500*000 accounted for 83.2 percent of the failing and 68*7 percent 
of the non-failing group. Banks with total deposits of less than 
$350*000 included 8U.1 percent of the failing and 70.9 percent of 
the non-failing banks. These percentages reveal the small size of 
failing banks during this period in Montana.
The relationship of bank size to bank failure rate was recog­
nized clearly by contemporary authorities on banking. The role of 
government supervision in the problem of bank failures during this 
period was discussed in considerable detail. The nation-wide epi­
demic of bank failures was confined largely to small banks in small 
towns. Generally* these areas were agricultural. Government policy 
in the chartering of banks was responsible* in part* for the creation
uof the large number of small banks. The divided nature of govern­
mental bank supervision led to governmental competition in the grant­
ing of bank charters and the subsequent regulation of banking opera­
tions. The result of this situation was a highly competitave banking 
system largely composed of numerous small unit banks. These banks 
fiercely competed for the available business and found it difficult* 
as a result of this competition* to pursue conservative banking 
practices. . During the years following the First World War* banks 
generally prospered in spite of management policies. The inexperi­
enced bank management that existed was in part the product of this 
small unit banking system. Individuals who knew little about financial
uSee Chapter III for a discussion of the role of governmental 
charter policy and its relationship to bank failures during this period.
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operations or general economic trends were permitted to establish banks 
because of their personal integrity and possession of the necessary 
amount for minimum capital requirements. Such a basis was not suffi­
cient to provide sound bank management. The amount of business avail­
able to the small rural bank precluded the employment of experienced 
bank managers. One author points to this difficulty by stating that 
''no community can possibly provide adequate resources, competent offi­
cers, and experienced directors for one bank to every 750 of its in­
habitants as in North Dakota, or to 1,U00 as in I o w a . I n  Montana
7the ratio in 1921 was 1,370 inhabitants to each bank.
Other more general economic forces were at work to decrease 
the importance of the small rural bank. Advances in transportation 
and communication facilities increasingly e x t e n d e d  the urban influ­
ence into rural areas. This invasion meant a decline of rural bank 
business. Large city-centers were often within reach of rural areas. 
For various reasons, residents in rural areas often found it advan­
tageous to utilize the facilities of large city banks rather than 
small local institutions. In addition, other business enterprises 
invaded rural areas and branches of city' firms became common in the 
small communities. Receipts from these branches were sent to home 
offices where they were deposited in large city banks. These factors 
alone were enough to make serious inroads into rural banking busi­
ness. In addition to these factors, city banks enjoyed a larger
^Anderson, Control of Banking„ 315.
^Willit, Banking, 126.
'    i in — ~I ii ’ —
7'Supra, Table 1.
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degree of financial flexibility and often could meet credit demands 
that local banks, because of their limited resources, were unable to 
satisfy. These factors combined to decrease the importance of the 
small rural bank.
The geographical distribution of bank failures in Montana em­
phasized their rural agricultural nature. The area in Montana east of 
the Continental Divide experienced the failure of 56.2* percent of its 
banks during the 1920-1926 periodj in the area west of the Divide,
38.5 percent of the banks failed. Although the entire state economy 
was largely agricultural,, the eastern portion was more heavily depen­
dent upon agricultural production. In addition to this factor, the 
size of community where bank failures occurred supports the contention 
that the wave of bank failures was primarily a small-bank— small town 
phenomena. In the United States, 37 percent of the bank failures were 
located in towns of less than 500 inhabitants,. 78 percent in towns of
less than 2,500, and 96 percent in cities of less than 25,000 popula- 
8tion. In Montana, 57»9 percent of the failing banks were located
9—- in communities of less than 500 population.
In addition to being relatively small rural banks serving 
sparcely populated agricultural areas, failing banks in Montana were 
relatively new institutions. Many of the banks that failed had existed 
only a short time prior to the banking crisis of the early 1920‘s.
Only 3 percent of the failing banks and 9 percent of the non-failing
banks were in business prior to 1900 in Montana. Of these failing
\
\8 'Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 1925, 32̂
?Supra, Table 10.
banks5 79 percent were incorporated during the 193,0-1920 periodj 
68 percent of the non-failing bank group were incorporated during 
the same period. Lacking operating experience during periods 
of economic stress, Montana banks faced grave difficulties during 
the severe conditions of the early 1920's.
The critical problem that faced the small bank was essen­
tially its inability to achieve financial diversification of its 
earning assets. Generally, the small size of rural banks confined 
its operations to a small locality and a limited number of enter­
prises and industries. Therefore, small banks lacked the ability 
and resources to adequately diversify their financial holdings and 
thereby to protect against economic fluctuations. This spreading 
of risk was an accepted method of protecting against declines in 
different economic sectors and industries. Since the small rural 
banks in Montana were closely related to their local economy, their 
investments and loans were heavily dependent on local conditions. 
Little financial diversification was possible. This investment 
policy was profitable while the value of rural agricultural land 
was increasing and farm mortgages were yielding high returns. With 
the price declines of 1920 and the serious conditions caused by the 
drought, the basis of bank prosperity was undermined. The lack of 
financial diversification was fatal. Indeed, Mr. J. W. Pole, the 
Comptroller of the Currency, pointed to the lack of diversification
as the primary and fundamental cause of the difficulties of country
11banks during this period.
^ Supra, Table 11.
1 *1Bradford, Banking, 1|.31“32.
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With the widespread wave of bank failures in the 1920's, pro­
posals were advanced to correct the inherent weaknesses of the banking 
system. The basic weakness of the small unit banking system as it 
developed in the United States was well recognized prior to the 1920 
crisis. With the widespread bank failures of this period, the need 
for corrective action became even more apparent. Unit banking propon­
ents staunchly defended the system as the best system to fulfill the 
local credit needs of an area. The unit banker was a local man who 
knew the individual character of inhabitants and the local credit 
needs of his community. There was a strong resistance on this basis 
to outside interference in local affairs.
The proponents of branch and group banking pointed to itsgil 
advantages as an answer to the small rural bank problems. Branch or 
group banking allowed the diversification of loans and investments 
with a resulting decrease in the credit risk. In addition, since loan 
demand varied, the branch banking system could easily transfer funds 
from area to area resulting in better utilization of available capital. 
This process would result in more uniform interest rates between dif­
ferent areas. In addition, the extension of credit by a branch system 
could be undertaken safely with a smaller reserve than would be neces­
sary for a unit„system. The entire system would provide for a more
efficient utilization of available capital as well as allowing the
12employment of more highly trained personnel. It was pointed out that 
the operation of small unit banks resulted in high operating costs be­
cause of the high overhead expenses in relation to the small volume of
1 ?Bradford, Banking, Ul3»
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13business. This problem would be solved by a branch banking system. 
Against these advantages3 unit bank proponents argued that branch 
bankers lacked the intimate knowledge of local affairs and individuals 
that was essential to proper credit distribution. It was assumed that 
local banks were able to judge better the credit needs of the local 
community.
The encouragement of group and branch banking in many respects 
seemed to be the answer to the small bank dilemma. Branch or group 
banks could provide the services needed by rural areas without loss 
of diversification of assets and financial strength. The proposal 
was an attempt to overcome the disadvantages presented by the small 
size of rural banks. In many respects it provided a reasonable solu­
tion to a serious rural banking problem; the small size of banking 
institutions. As such it represented a notable step toward providing 
rural areas with the banking stability available to city residents 
in the same general area.
13Anderson* Control of Banking, 315
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS
Failing banks in Montana during the 1920-1926 period had sev­
eral distinct characteristics. Generally, state banks failed more 
often than national banks and the same relationship existed between 
state non-member and Federal Reserve member banks. Failing banks 
were usually small institutions whether measured by capital, total 
deposits, or total resources. Failures occurred more often in the 
area east of the Continental Divide than in the western portion of 
the state. Generally, failing banks were located in small communi­
ties. In addition, failing banks were relatively new institutions
years or less.
The role of governmental actions in the bank failures of this 
period is of considerable importance. Governmental authorities con­
tributed to a weakening of the banking system through the granting 
of an excessive number of bank charters and the competitive lowering 
of banking requirements. Indeed, the overbanked condition of Montana 
was an important factor in the bank failures of this period. Coirpeti- 
tion between governmental authorities made officials reluctant to 
strictly enforce or strengthen banking requirements. In this sense, 
the actions of the Banking Department in Montana and the Comptroller 
of the Currency were partially responsible for the bank failures in^ 
Montana during the early 1920's.
with nearly one-half of the total number
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The role of the Federal Reserve System in the bank failures 
of this period received a considerable amount of attention. Redis- 
count rate policy was sharply criticized as a conscious effort by 
the Federal Reserve System to force a rapid liquidation of banking 
credit.'*" This accusation was .not true. In 1920 the Federal Reserve 
System initiated a policy of restricting credit in an effort to re­
lieve inflationary pressures. This policy was long overdue. Since 
open-market operations were not generally used as a tool for credit 
control until a later date, this policy relied upon an increase in 
the rediscount rate. The effectiveness of this tool was limited 
since it left the initiative with the member banks. The elimination 
of the preferential rediscount rate on government securities was a 
necessary part of this restrictive credit policy. Banks tended to 
rediscount securities that enjoyed the lowest rediscount rate? in 
practice these rates became the effective rates. If credit was to be 
restricted, this difference had to be eliminated. The sharp decline 
in the price of these securities was an unfortunate result of this 
change. However, the policy was necessary and certainly indicated 
no attempt by the Federal Reserve to force down the price of govern- 
ment securities.
In Montana, the Federal Reserve System followed a realistic 
policy. Banks were generally in a difficult financial position and 
many were greatly overextended. The Alarming financial condition
1Joseph Kinsey Howard, Montana; High, Wide, and Handsome 
(New Haven, 19U3)* 21Q-23U passim. Cited hereafter as Howard, 
Montana.
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2of Montana banks made the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis reluc­
tant to encourage further credit expansion by lowering the rediscount 
rates. Indeed, it seems doubtful that lower rediscount rates would 
have provided a solution to the difficulties. When banks are heavily 
overextended as they were in Montana in 1921, an easy credit policy 
is not the answer to a strengthening of the banking system. The Fed­
eral Reserve System could not prevent bank failures that were the re­
sult of unwise bank policy. Government supervision could not conden­
sate for poor bank management.
The objectives of the Federal Reserve System did not include 
the support of existing price levels. The charge that the Federal
3Reserve System attempted to force down agricultural prices was with­
out merit. Agricultural prices were determined largely by world-wide 
conditions during this period. The agricultural price declines of 
the early 1920’s had no significant relationship to Federal Reserve 
policies in the Ninth District.
The role of the Federal Reserve System in the control of credit 
had not fully crystallized by the early 1920's. It was a relatively 
new organization. While it is evident that the Federal Reserve Sys­
tem could have acted more vigorously to curb the deflationary spiral, 
it is equally clear that it did not pursue a policy of forcing a radi­
cal liquidation upon the banking system. Indeed, its credit extensions 
allowed many banks to continue to carry large amounts of overdue paper.
2Supra, Table 18.
3Howard, Montana, 212. The author charges that the Federal 
Reserve felt that agricultural products were inflated in value and 
decided to pursue a policy of deflating farm prices.
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Within the framework of economic theory accepted by Federal Reserve 
officials, the policies of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
- were reasonable. Certainly, Federal Reserve policy cannot be regarded 
as a major cause of bank failures in Montana during this period.
c  -• -The agricultural conditions of the early 1920!s were another 
important factor in Montana bank failures. Generally, Montana banks 
were closely related to the rural farm economy. Adverse climatic:.' 
conditions and rapidly falling farm prices and income were faced by 
a highly Inflated farm debt. The local drought conditions and the' ’ 
production of agricultural products that were heavily dependent upon 
export demand left Montana in a difficult position. With the agri­
cultural crisis, , many banks were unable to withstand the financial 
strain. Certainly, the widespread wave of bank failures in Montana 
during the early 1920 !s was in part a reflection of this agricultural 
distress.
The financial strength of many banks allowed them to with­
stand the economic crisis of the early 19201s. Not all banks were 
overextended and those that were successful in maintaining depositor 
confidence and earnings were often able to survive. Generally, the 
balance sheet accounts of Montana banks in 1920 revealed a relative­
ly weak financial condition. Financial ratios and account balances 
of Montana banks, when compared with nation-wide averages, partially 
explain the higher failure rate. In each comparison made, Montana 
banks reflected a weaker financial condition. This financial posi­
tion was an important factor in the ability of banks to withstand 
the strains of the period.
8U
The size of a banking institution was often related to its fi­
nancial strength. Generally, small banks lacked the ability to proper­
ly diversify their earning assets. This left them heavily,'dependent 
upon the local economy. When local economic conditions deteriorated 
as they did in Montana following the First World War, banks were often 
unable to withstand the strain. As a result many of the banks in 
these.areas failed.
Numerous causes existed for the bank failures in Montana during 
the early 1920*s. Governmental policy, agricultural factors, financial 
strength and bank size were all important parts of the bank failure 
pattern. It was a combination of these factors that produced the tragic 
bank failures of this period. The lessons taught by these events were 
significant in the years that followed. A new banking code was passed 
in Montana in the late 19201s that strengthened the state banking sys­
tem. In addition, the role of the Federal Reserve System was further 
crystallized. In these and many other ways, the tragic failures fo­
cused attention on the weakness of the existing banking system. The 
changes and improvements made as a result of these experiences pro­
duced a stronger banking system. Certainly, the bank failures of 
this period left their imprint upon the future.
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